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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Lodging Industry:
An Econometric Analysis
by
Laurence David Rosoff
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on
August 11, 1995, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Science in Real Estate Development
This thesis is an attempt to assist developers and investors with making
knowledgeable decisions about when to build or invest in the U.S. lodging industry.
A 26 year, quarterly time series data set on the industry was econometrically
analyzed to better understand the market behavior, cycles, and the major influences
on demand and supply. Four stochastic and three identity models were created.
First, room absorption was determined as an adjustment model whereby the
change in the number of rooms sold is primarily a function of GDP and to a lesser
extent real average room rates and domestic enplanements. This model was found
to adjust fairly quickly towards its target room absorption and the price elasticity of
room demand was found to be inelastic.
Second, the change in the real average room rate was determined primarily by an
elastic relationship with the occupancy rate and to a lesser extent inflation rates.
This model found that average room rates adjust very slowly over time.
Third, construction was modeled primarily as a function of the existing room stock
and real average rates; and to a lesser extent, interest rates, room rate inflation and
room absorption. This model demonstrated that construction levels adjust very
quickly to market changes. The relationship between room rates and construction
and room rates and total room stock were shown to be very elastic.
Finally, room scrappage or demolition was modeled as a function of the annual
change in real GDP, real average room rates, construction and real interest rates.
Scrappage was shown to have a very elastic relationship with the average room rate.
Furthermore, most of the models demonstrated that decisions for the hotel
industry are based on market behavior from last year versus last quarter.
The thesis concludes with the stock/flow model analyzing two 10 year forecasts
beginning in 1995. The first scenario maintained interest rates and inflation at
current levels and forecasted GDP and enplanement growth at 2.5%/year and
1 %/quarter respectively. The second scenario introduced a recession and
subsequent recovery starting in mid-1997.
Both forecasts indicated that now is an opportune time for investment because
the lodging industry is about to enter a conservative construction phase induced by
higher room and occupancy rates.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Title: Professor of Economics
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Statement of the Problem
In the past decade the United States lodging industry has experienced one of
its biggest booms and subsequently, one of its worst busts in history. Room
rates have declined, occupancies have plummeted and development has come
to a virtual standstill. In 1991 alone, it was estimated that the lodging industry
lost $5.2 billion'. Though over-supply was apparent in the late 1980's, active
development continued into 1992, compounding this problem until occupancy
declined to a low of 60.2%2. Only recently has there been renewed interest in
hotel development.
Hotel industry analysts are now trying to forecast the prospect of investing into
the lodging industry. The question now is when should new development begin
again? How can better predictions be made? What kinds of exogenous factors
contribute to the uncertainties of the lodging industry?
Purpose of Study
Hotel development is an involved and complicated process where timing is
critical. This thesis is intended to track and analyze time series data of the
United States lodging industry and create an econometric stock/flow model.
Through this data analysis, cyclical movements of the lodging industry can be
tracked and the behavior of the lodging market understood. The principal
variables of lodging supply and demand can be identified and their elasticities
investigated. With this cognizance of the lodging industry, the model will be
effective for forecasting future demand, rates, and stock of hotel rooms given a
1 Coopers & Lybrand, "Lodging Industry Losses to Decline 4.1% in 1992 from $5.2 Billion in
1991, as Economy Slowly Recovers", Hospitality Directions, Vol. Il No. Ill, Fall 1992, p.6
2 Stephen Rushmore, "An Overview of the Hotel Industry: Past, Present, and Future", The Real
Estate Finance Journal, Vol.9/No.4 Spring 1994, p.7
forecast of the national economy, general economic conditions and domestic
airline passengers.
This study was conducted on the United States lodging market as an
aggregate to determine trends in the industry. The specific model and data
apply to the United States as a whole. With regional modification, more micro
level forecasting should be possible.
Thesis Organization
Chapter 1 begins with a brief description of the United States lodging industry
and an introduction to frequently used lodging industry terminology. The chapter
then presents previous research, focusing on two prior studies: Coopers &
Lybrand and Salomon Brothers. The lodging industry real estate cycle is then
described and a general description of the model's methodology and structure is
explained. Finally, a table listing the variables used in the subsequent models is
presented.
Chapter 2 focuses on lodging industry demand. The chapter begins by
identifying the factors affecting demand and introduces the reader to the general
data. The chapter then proceeds to develop the demand side econometric
models and analyzes the results from the 26 year data series.
Chapter 3 repeats Chapter 2's structure but from a supply side perspective.
The reader is introduced to the factors affecting the supply side of the lodging
industry and the general data. The chapter continues with the development of
the supply side lodging econometric model and analyzes the results from the 26
year data series.
Chapter 4 combines the demand models developed in Chapter 2 and the
supply models developed in Chapter 3 with two forecasts of the exogenous
variables. Scenario A forecasts steady moderate growth in GDP and domestic
enplanements and maintains inflation and interest rates at current levels.
Scenario B maintains the same forecasts as Scenario A for enplanements,
inflation rates and interest rates but introduces a recession and subsequent
recovery in GDP starting in mid -1997. Thereafter, the number of rooms sold
(demand), completed (construction), and scrapped (demolished) are forecast as
well the average room rates, occupancy rates and room stock (supply) for the
next ten years. It will be shown that regardless of which scenario is accepted,
now is a good time to invest into the lodging industry. This recommendation is
concluded from forecasts that predict that the lodging industry is on the cusp of a
moderate development period, spurred on by rising room rates.
Description of the United States Lodging Market
The United States lodging industry is estimated to be worth over $200 billion
in assets. Altogether there are approximately 3.2 million guestrooms, in over
40,000 establishments, which generate a total quarterly industry revenue of over
$73 billion dollars3 or over 1% of the Gross Domestic Product.
There are many ways of describing hotel properties. Classification systems
abound but the most popular classifications are by class, type, and location.
Class rating is a combined assessment of the property's quality and staff service.
Type classification refers to the physical attributes of the property. Lastly,
location classification refers to the market to whom the property is catering.
Stephen Rushmore of Hospitality Valuation Services, an international hospitality
appraisal and consulting firm, outlines the classifications in his book Hotel
Investment, A Guide for Lenders and Owners as follows:4
3 Coopers & Lybrand, "Coopers & Lybrand 12 Quarter Lodging Forecast", Hospitality
Directions, Vol.II1 No.1, Winter 1993, p.11.
4 Stephen Rushmore, Hotel Investments, A Guide for Lenders and Owners (Boston-New York,
Warren Goreham & Lamont, Inc. 1990), p.3-2-3-7
Table 1.1 - Property Classifications
Method Classification Method Classification
Class Luxury Type Commercial
First-Class Convention
Standard (mid-rate) Resort
Economy(budget) Suite
Microbudget Extended Stay
Conference Center
Location Airport Microtel
Highway Casino
Downtown Bed & Breakfast Inn
Suburban Ma & Pa Motel
Convention Center Boutique Hotel
Resort Health Spa
Mixed-Use _Boatel
For the purpose of this study, all hotel types, regardless of the classification
system, were used.
By not discriminating as to hotel type, biases that may be present in the data
can be mitigated. For example, the demand equation for an airport hotel could
vary greatly from that of a resort because of various exogenous factors.
Including all hotel types and using general exogenous data, avoids classification
biases for they are averaged and theoretically offset each other.
Previous Studies
In mid-M991, Coopers & Lybrand introduced their United States Lodging
Econometric Model in their quarterly publication Hospitality Directions. Coopers
& Lybrand uses their model for three purposes.
The model primarily focuses on statistically forecasting the lodging industry.
Second, the model is used as a means of understanding the market behavior of
the lodging industry and its relationship to the general economy. Third, the
model is utilized to assess the impact of various long term economic scenarios
on the lodging industry.
Coopers & Lybrand's lodging data base is organized quarterly and contains
data on most key lodging variables from 1967 to the present. The data is a
compilation of information from various sources including F.W. Dodge, Smith
Travel Research5, the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Economic Analysis and
industry publications. Cooper's & Lybrand kindly provided a copy of their time
series data set for use in this study.
The Coopers & Lybrand quarterly lodging model includes three stochastic
equations representing room demand, the percentage change in average daily
rate and construction starts. Using accounting identities based on the three
equations eighteen additional indicators are calculated. The model is estimated
using the ordinary least squares method over the life of the data base.6
In a 1995 report, Coopers & Lybrand assessed the performance of their model
using the average absolute percent error and root mean square percent error
methods. The average absolute error is defined as the sum of the difference
between the simulated errors and actual errors divided by the actual errors value
for the appropriate period. The root mean square percent error is defined as the
square root of the sum of the squared errors divided by the actual error value in
each period. They reported that when the model was simulated from 1987 Q1
through the 1991 Q4 both prediction errors were less than 3% of most key
variables.7
Coopers & Lybrand concluded from their model that 99% of the variation in
the number of rooms sold is attributable to changes in real Gross Domestic
Product and real room rates.
GDP was the major determiner and it appears that the lodging industry
adjusts to economic growth with a four period lag and that the yearly GDP
8
elasticity of demand is 1.3 .
s Smith Travel Research performs a monthly survey of 12,000 to 13,000 lodging properties and
publishes the findings in its own Lodging Outlook newsletter. They also maintain a database with
profile information on over 27,000 hotels.
6 Coopers and Lybrand, "Econometric Forecasting, Understanding the U.S. Lodging Industry",
(Coopers and Lybrand 1995) p.1
7 Ibid p.3
8 Ibid p.4
They also concluded that average daily rate's effects on the number of rooms
sold is small. Their calculated price elasticity of demand for the aggregate
United States was only 0.399. This low elasticity was argued to be due to the
lack of a substitute product for hotel rooms.
Regarding the average daily rate, Cooper's & Lybrand determined that
occupancy was the primary influence. For example, if the occupancy declines,
hotel operators lower rates to attract more business.
In their third stochastic equation, they calculate hotel room starts as a room
adjustment process. Because construction is not instantaneous, the adjustment
takes several periods to be completed. Though using room completions is
technically the correct way to measure the room stock change, they feel that
room starts are more closely related to the economy. In their equation, the
average daily rate was identified as the key variable driving construction with an
elasticity of 7.31.
Overall, the Coopers & Lybrand U.S. Lodging Model has a successful track
record for forecasting and analyzing the United States lodging industry. It is
updated quarterly, as are all projections made from the time series.
A second statistical lodging model was also reviewed. In mid-1991, Salomon
Brothers created a demand-forecasting model based on three key variables; real
Gross National Product (GNP), gasoline prices and the dollar exchange rate.
They also concluded that real GNP was the dominant indicator of lodging
demand growth. Gasoline prices and the dollar exchange rate were less
influential and were negatively correlated with lodging demand.
Simply stated, as fuel prices increased, the cost of automobile and airline
travel increased, hence less people traveled and the demand for lodging rooms
decreased.
9 Coopers and Lybrand, "Econometric Forecasting, Understanding the U.S. Lodging Industry",
(Coopers and Lybrand 1995) p.5
10 Ibid p.7
1 Margo L. Vignola and Jill S. Krutick, "U.S. Lodging Industry on the Rebound", Salomon
Brothers Stock Research, May 1991, p.6.
As the dollar strengthens, more Americans travel abroad and less foreigners
travel to the U.S. hence the demand for hotel rooms decreases.
The model seems to have been discontinued for there is no mention of this
model in recent Salomon Brothers lodging research12. Therefore, any historical
predictor quality could not be determined.
With regard to additional previous research on econometric lodging
forecasting, the industry research from most of the premier hospitality and
lodging consulting, management and accounting companies was reviewed. No
additional, true statistical analysis or forecasting that is used on a continuous
basis could be found. It appears that most forecasts for the future demand of the
lodging industry are based on trend-line extrapolation related to the Gross
Domestic Product versus any type of true econometric methodology.
This trend analysis is inferior to the contingent economic forecasting being
employed by Coopers & Lybrand and in this paper. These other companies'
forecasts are only statistically related to time and based on a third party's
forecast of Gross Domestic Product. There are additional variables, other than
Gross Domestic Product, that influence the hotel industry and therefore, must be
considered. These variables include the number of people traveling, interest
rates, inflation and construction costs. Each variable not only has its own
elasticity with respect to the lodging industry but also interacts with each other.
Because these influences can move independently of each other, short term
variations are often not evident. Usually with trend analysis, only a long term
trend can be forecast and any short term oscillations from this trend will be
missed. These oscillations can translate into millions of dollars saved or lost.
Related to this missing of trends, cyclical fluctuations in the industry can also
be missed. The lodging industry, like all industries, cycles through peaks and
troughs. By only analyzing trends, an overall "average" is forecast. This
average ignores the cyclical fluctuations that can optimize an investment.
12 The most recent major research being: W. Bruce Turner, "The Lodging Industry - Recovery
May Be Here for an Extended Stay", Salomon Brothers Equity Research, October 11, 1994.
Alternatively, by ignoring the cyclical fluctuations of the industry, an investment at
an inopportune time (i.e. at the peak of the cycle) may be made.
Methodology of Study
Study Area
The area for study is the United States of America. This includes all fifty
states but excludes any territories or possessions.
The United States as a whole was chosen for numerous reasons. First, data
for the whole United States is readily available when compared to data for a
region or a foreign country. Second, by choosing the entire United States,
regional attributes that may skew the data can be mitigated. Additionally,
regional economic influences can be avoided.
Time Frame
Data for this model was collected for a twenty-six year period (1969-1994)
which allowed for observations over four business cycles.
Additionally, each year was reported on a quarterly basis which provides for a
maximum of one hundred and four observations.
Property Types
This model was constructed to include all hotel types and sizes. No specific
hotel type was excluded".
By using the entire lodging market, specific attributes associated with one type
of hotel that may skew the data can be mitigated.
Furthermore, influences from increases or decreases in one type of hotel such
as the 1980's increase in all-suite hotels can also be avoided.
The Lodging Industry Real Estate Cycle
All real estate markets operate on the fundamental principles of supply and
demand. In the lodging industry, demand can be defined as the number of
13See Table 1.1.
rooms occupied and supply can be defined as the number of rooms available.
Because vacant hotel rooms are instantly obsolete (unsold hotel rooms are
unrecoverable), finding an equilibrium between the two is imperative.
A logical question then to ask is why hotels have so many vacant rooms? The
lodging industry is a seasonal business because travel is seasonal. This means
that during certain months the number of travelers increases, while in others it
14decreases . In some markets, this seasonality can cause occupancy to vary by
40%. Because rooms cannot be inventoried, hotels are built with supply trending
towards the peak demand times in order to maximize revenues. This equates to
a large percentage of hotel rooms that are vacant during non-peak periods. If
this vacancy is averaged over the entire year, a structural vacancy emerges.
A fundamental problem exists within the lodging industry concerning the
demand/supply balance of hotel rooms. For the lodging industry, demand
changes daily. Conversely, supply adjustments takes much longer. With these
different adjustment rates a real estate cycle emerges triggered by changes in
the occupancy rate.
At the beginning of a real estate cycle, we start with a level of hotel room
stock and a structural vacancy. The room rate is based on the availability of
rooms in the marketplace combined with an option component. The option
component is the value associated with leaving the room vacant for a potential
higher paying guest versus renting the room now.
The room rate multiplied by the number of available rooms and the occupancy
rate determines a total room revenue. This room revenue is then translated into
property prices in the asset market15. These asset prices will generate new
construction if, and only if, they are higher than the cost of constructing a new
property. This new construction eventually yields a new, higher level of stock.16
14 See the section on seasonal adjustments for a full discussion.
1s Room revenue was focused on because of the high contribution margins to net operating
income as compared to non-room revenue.
16 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.1-15.
As new hotel construction occurs and the stock of hotel rooms rises,
occupancy begins to decline which causes the room rates to decline. Eventually,
this lowered room rate equates to a lower asset value. This lower asset value
gradually reduces the construction rate. Ultimately, the construction cost
surpasses the asset value and new construction will cease. Due to the inherent
lag of constructing new hotels, new room stock is still entering the market for
approximately one and a half years after new construction has stopped. This
additional over supply of rooms further depresses room rates which in turn
equates to even lower asset values.1
With no new construction, the hotel stock slowly decreases due to scrappage
(economic obsolescence). As the stock of hotel rooms decreases, occupancy
rates increase and with it real average room rates. Additionally, occupancy
increases can also come about from a gradually expanding economy.
Regardless of the reason, this increasing room rate increases the asset prices.
Ultimately, room rates rise until the asset value surpasses the replacement cost
and construction begins anew.
Description of Model
The lodging industry econometric model that was created for this study is
comprised of four behavioral equations and three accounting identity equations.
The interrelation among the seven equations is illustrated as a flow diagram in
Chart 1.1.
The first equation to be presented is an identity equation used for updating
the total room demand (ROOMS SOLD) in each period. It states that the
demand this period is equal to the change in room demand (room absorption)
added to the to the demand in the previous period.
As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the room demand in a period is dependent
on two main factors: people's propensity to travel and the ease at which this
17 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.10-10-10-19.
travel can be accomplished. For example, if people are more inclined to travel
due to low room rates or air fares, demand for rooms increases. Room demand
will therefore be identified as a function of the endogenous variable, real
average room rates and two exogenous variables: the economy (GDP) and the
number of domestic airline passengers (ENPLANEMENTS).
This room demand is used in a second identity equation for determining the
occupancy rate. The occupancy rate is calculated as a ratio of the room demand
(ROOM SOLD) to the room supply (ROOM STOCK).
The average room rate is then calculated as a function of the occupancy
rate and the exogenous variable of inflation.
With this forecast of average rates, the number of room completions
(construction) can be determined. Room completions will be determined as a
function of the following endogenous and exogenous variables: existing room
stock (supply), the average room rate, the changes in this average rate, the
change in the number of rooms sold (room absorption), and interest rates
(treasury notes are used as a proxy). These variables represent the two main
influences on construction: demand and financing.
Chart 1.1 - Lodging Industry Econometric Model Flow Diagram'8
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The final stochastic equation determines scrappage which will be shown to be
a function of a property's existing and potential revenue earning capabilities.
These capabilities are based on economic conditions (GDP, interest rates and
inflation) and the aforementioned room completions (new construction).
Finally, the third accounting identity updates the room stock (total supply) by
taking last period's stock, adding any room completions and subtracting any
scrappage. This new room stock, in turn, influences the number of room
completions and the occupancy rate.
By combining the four econometric models with the three identities, a full
stock flow model can be constructed and lodging industry forecasting can be
performed. The complete model is recursive which means that information from
a previous period determines this period's data which in turn determines next
period's data and so on.
Glossary of Key Variables
Table 1.2 presents the codes and definitions of the key variables used in the
econometric model that will be developed in Chapters 2 and 3 and forecasted in
Chapter 4.
Table 1.2 - Key Variable Definitions
ABBREVIATION DEFINITION
0C Occupancy Rate
R Real Average Room Rate
C Room Completions (Construction)
AB Change in Number of Rooms
Demanded or Sold Between two
periods (Absorption)
SOLD Number of Rooms Sold
S Rooms Supply or Available (Stock)
ENPLANE Domestic Enplanements
GDP Gross Domestic Product ($1990)
8 Scrappage (Demolition)
TNOTES 10 Year Treasury Note Rates
INF Real Inflation Rate
REALRATE Treasury Note Rate minus
the Inflation Rate
(t) (W-1) (t-4) Subscripts Designating Time Periods
A Prefix Designating Yearly Change in
Corresponding Periods
%DIFF Suffix Designating the Yearly
Percentage Change from
Corresponding Periods
CHAPTER 2
Demand
This chapter is devoted to the subject of demand for the U.S. lodging industry.
In the first section, the 26 year time series data is presented and the
determinants of demand are identified. Interaction between endogenous and
exogenous variables is examined as is the interrelationship between
endogenous variables. With this information, an econometric model for demand
is subsequently developed. The time series is processed and the chapter
concludes with an analysis of the results.
Factors Affecting Demand for Hotel Rooms
National hotel room demand depends on two primary factors: people's
propensity for travel and the ease at which this travel can be done. These
factors are primarily affected by exogenous influences including economic,
geographic, political, technological and seasonal. The issue at hand is whether
it is possible to develop an econometric model that will accurately forecast this
demand as these variables change.
Economic
Most lodging industry analysts believe that the demand19 for hotel rooms
tends to track the state of the national economy. Because the entire United
States lodging market was observed as opposed to a region or metro-area,
correlation with national macroeconomic trends is apparent. The fluctuations
associated with local or regional economies seem to cancel each other. The
basis for this hypothesis can be observed in the apparent correlations in Charts
2.1 and 2.2 and will be statistically verified in the subsequent model. Gross
Domestic Product20 is used as a proxy for the national economy comparisons.
19 Demand is defined as the number of guest rooms sold during a given period.
20 GDP was compiled from the International Financial Statistics Yearbook published by the
International Monetary Fund. It is defined as the sum of final expenditures: Exports of Goods and
Services, Imports of Goods and Services, Private Consumption, Government Consumption,
20
Chart 2.1 shows that in the long run, hotel demand (the number of rooms
sold) tends to track the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Where GDP
increased 89% in real terms over the 26 year period, the number of rooms sold
increased 118%.
For short term observations, the historical fluctuations in lodging demand also
tend to synchronize with the changes in real GDP (Chart 2.2). This is logical for
people's propensity for travel is generally influenced by the state of the economy.
For the business traveler, companies tend to increase their workforce travel in
expanding economies. This may be due to increased sales efforts or meetings.
Conversely, in recessing economies, companies tend to cut expenses and travel
is rated as the third largest corporate expense.
In the leisure market, expanding economies employ more people who in turn
have vacation days. Alternatively, in recessing economies, disposable income
decreases and layoffs occur, both of which translate as a decrease in leisure
travel. This decrease in demand is blatantly apparent during the recessions of
the mid 1970's, early 1980's and early 1990's.
Chart 2.1
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Chart 2.2
ANNUAL CHANGE IN HOTEL DEMAND VS ANNUAL CHANGE IN REAL GDP
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Demand, when compared to supply, determines the occupancy rate.
Occupancy then influences the average room rate which in turn, influences the
room demand. The circular relationship between these variables requires that a
balance be achieved between the occupancy and average room rate.
For the long term, the historical negative relationship between room rate and
occupancy can be observed in Chart 2.3. As can be seen, the real average rate
increase from the late 1970's through the late 1980's was met with a similar but
opposite decrease in occupancy. The building boom that was associated with
the capitalization of high room rates ended with the 1987 tax changes. The
oversupply and low occupancy rates forced hotel operators to decrease their real
room rates from 1988 through 1991 in order to increase occupancy. It was not
until early 1992 that occupancy's turn around was apparent and room rates
could cautiously begin to rise.
21 The Occupancy Rate can be defined as the percentage of available rooms occupied for a
given period. This data was provided by Smith Travel Research via Coopers & Lybrand.
Chart 2.3
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However, in the short term, Chart 2.4 illustrates that room rate adjustments
are somewhat positively correlated with occupancy rates after 1975. As
occupancy rates increase, the real average room rate increases due to demand.
But, once the occupancy increase begins to taper off and turn downward, hotel
operators begin to lower rates in an attempt to arrest this downward trend and
hopefully reverse it.
Before 1975, the high inflation rates combined with an oversupply of hotel
stock derailed the short term occupancy/room rate relationship. Again in the late
1980's and early 1990's, these two variables unhitched due to the oversupply
and economic recession. It appears that post 1992, the correlation has
corrected itself.
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Chart 2.4
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Inflation, as one of the economy's major components, seems to have an
influence on the real average room rate. Economic theory argues that inflation's
effect on the real average room rate should be neutral. Therefore, the room rate
inflation should synchronize to the economic inflation. Referring to Chart 2.5, it is
obvious that for the lodging industry this is not the case.
In Chart 2.5, the horizontal line at 0% represents the theorized neutral effect
of inflation. If this theory was to hold true, the room rate inflation should also be
a horizontal line at 0%. As can be seen, real room rate inflation oscillates on
either side of this 0% line. The room rate inflation rate was less than economic
inflation in both the mid-1970's and early 1990's. This means that the hotel
operators were absorbing a part of the nominal cost increases which decreased
their real average room rate. This room rate deflation occurred in both a high
economic inflation period (mid-1 970's) and a low economic inflation period (early
1990's). The effect of this on room rates is apparent back in Chart 2.3 where in
real terms, hotel rooms are earning less revenue per occupied room in the
1990's than they were in the late 1980's.
Alternatively, hotel operators raised room rates higher than the inflation rate in
the late 1970's and again throughout the 1980's. Consequently, their average
room rate grew in real terms. Again, this increase happened in high inflationary
periods, (late 1970's/early 1980's) and low inflationary periods (mid-1980's).
It could be theorized that the tendency for room rate inflation to be lower or
higher than real economic inflation depends on occupancy levels combined with
the interest rates. If the occupancy rate is high and nominal inflation is high, as
they were in the late 1970's/early 1980's, hotel operators increase room rates
faster than the economic inflation rate.
Alternatively, if occupancy is low an inflation is high or trending upward, hotel
operators are apprehensive about raising room rates which, in turn, would further
lower the occupancy rate.
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The aforementioned decrease in the real average room rate translates into
less real room revenue
2 2 
and subsequently total revenue
2 3
(Chart 2.6) for a
22 Room Revenue represents the total revenue earned from room sales only during a specified
period. It can be calculated as an identity by multiplying the Average Room Rate by the total
number of Rooms Sold for the same period. This data was provided by Smith Travel Research
via Coopers & Lybrand.
25
lodging property. Because room revenue historically represents 65% of the total
hotel revenue and has the highest contribution margin 24, any drop in the real
room revenue has a significant overall effect on the profitability of the industry.
Chart 2.6
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The strength of the U.S. dollar against other currencies also affects lodging
demand. If the U.S. dollar is weak against foreign currencies, their will be an
increase in foreign tourism to the United States, especially in the cities that tend
to attract foreigners (e.g. San Francisco, New York, Boston). An increase in
tourism means an increase in the demand for hotel rooms.
Alternatively, if the dollar is strong against foreign currencies, foreign tourists
do not travel to the United States and the level of U.S. tourism to foreign
countries increases. Both factors decrease domestic U.S. travel and
consequently reduce lodging demand.
23 Total Revenue represents all revenue earned from a hotel property during a specified
period. This includes room sales and other revenue department sales such as food and
beverage. This data was provided by Smith Travel Research via Coopers & Lybrand.
24 The percentage of departmental income that contributes to Net Operating Income.
Technological
Technological advances in travel have a great effect on lodging demand. The
increased use of the automobile in the 1950's gave rise to the roadside motel.
The growth of the airline industry in the past thirty years has increased both
domestic and international travel and thus increased lodging demand. While
room demand has increased an overall 118% in the 26 year observation period,
enplanements25 have increased 181% (Chart 2.7). More travelers equate to
more hotel guests and thus higher demand.
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Political
Government policy can have both positive and negative effects on demand.
For example, the deregulation of the airline industry decreased air travel costs
causing air travel to increase and with it the demand for hotel rooms.
25 Enplanements consist of all paying, domestic airline passengers. This data was collected
from The U.S. Department of Transportation's Air Traffic Statistics Monthly for 1984-1994 and the
Consumer Aviation Bureau's Air Carrier Traffic Statistics for 1969-1983.
Another example would be a local government's imposition of a hotel room tax
which can adversely effect tourism and in turn the demand for hotel rooms. A
room tax effectively raises the room rate to the end user and as presented
above, occupancy and average rate are negatively correlated.
Historically, the oil embargoes of the 1970's or the Gulf War in 1991 had
major negative impacts on the demand for lodging. Travel was difficult during
these periods. Less travel equates to less hotel room demand.
Seasonal
The lodging industry has always tended to be seasonal. This means that the
demand for rooms varies depending on exogenous factors such as the weather
or holidays. These variances tend to be repeated at the same time every year.
These seasonal variances make comparisons difficult within a property on a year
to year basis or even a month to month basis. This seasonality also inhibits
comparisons between different properties. Additionally, economic data such as
GDP is reported seasonally adjusted, hence comparisons and analysis to non-
adjusted lodging statistics are difficult.
These comparison problems can be solved through a process of seasonal
adjustment. This process corrects for changes in the time series data that are
solely attributable to systematic, periodic shifts in demand. In basic seasonal
adjusting, a moving average is used to distribute the changes in the time series
into three components:26
1. A trend component which represents the long term movement of the
series.
2. A seasonal component which represents the intra-year cyclical movement.
3. An irregular component which represents random movement.
All data for this thesis has been seasonally adjusted. The benefits of
seasonally adjusting data are apparent in the higher R2,S27 achieved in all
26 Coopers and Lybrand, "A Note on Seasonal Adjustments", Hospitality Directions, Vol. 11 No.
I, Winter 1992, p.12.
27 R2 can be defined as how well the data fits the linear regression equation.
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stochastic equations. Chart 2.8 illustrates the difference between non-adjusted
and seasonally adjusted occupancy data. As can be seen, the cyclicality
associated with the seasonality adds "noise" to the data. The smoothed data
allows the true trends to emerge which in turn provides better modeling results.
It is important to identify that the amplitude in occupancy's seasonal oscillation
has increase over the past 26 years. The seasonal swing in the early 1990's
appears to be twice that of the early 1970's. The reason for this increase is
unknown. One theory would suggest that the modern airline fare structure
(many rates vs a few rates) has amplified the seasonal travel patterns by
attracting a larger population. Increased airline customers equate to more
lodging demand.
Where seasonal adjustment is meant to average identical oscillations in
subsequent periods, it is now averaging smaller oscillations with larger ones.
This increase in the variance introduces the possibility that some seasonality still
exists in the data.
Chart 2.8
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The Model
A stock/flow modeling approach argues that in the short term, the occupancy
and average room rate adjust to equate the hotel room demand to the existing
stock of rooms. Alternatively, adjustments, such as new construction or
demolition, to the rooms available occur slowly over time and often with a lag.
The room supply adjustments respond to the average room rates determined in
28the market's short run equilibrium.
Using the stock/flow approach for modeling the lodging industry has two
distinct advantages over other modeling methods. First, by systematically
analyzing the 26 year time series data, the market behavior of the lodging
industry can be understood and the driving forces behind demand and supply
can be identified and modeled. Second, by processing the historical data
through the model, a basis for contingent econometric forecasting is created.
This procedure for forecasting will be demonstrated in Chapter 4. A major
benefit to contingent forecasting is that different scenarios depicting varying
degrees of risk can be analyzed.
As mentioned previously, the entire U.S. national lodging market was
observed due to the availability of 25 years of data. Using this data, it has been
possible to study methodically the long run trends in hotel construction, the stock
of space, room rates and vacancy rates through various economic cycles.
The following section was developed using the econometric modeling
techniques presented in William C. Wheaton and Denise DiPasquale's
forthcoming textbook, The Economics of Real Estate Markets.
Determinants of Demand
Demand in the lodging industry is defined as the number of rooms sold during
a given period2 9. Earlier it was stated that the lodging industry adjusts its
28 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.10-1.
29 In the case of this study, a period is defined as a quarter of a year
demand on a daily basis. The question is how is this demand determined and
adjusted?
Demand for lodging can be measured by the net change in the number of
rooms sold (room absorption) between this period and a previous period. A
question does arise as to which period comparisons should be made. As
explained in Chapter 1, the lodging industry is very cyclical and varies on the
weather, season and holidays. Therefore, there is little logical rationale for
comparing the number of rooms sold this period with the number of rooms sold
last period. For example, January's demand should not be compared with
December's considering the number of holidays in December. The statistical
comparison would be meaningless. Alternatively, it is logical to compare this
period's number of rooms sold, against the number of rooms sold during the
same period last year. Comparing this year's January results to last year's
January results will yield significant data. The influence of different lag periods
on the dependent variables was investigated and the end results are explained
below. With this in mind room demand this period (SOLD(t)) can be defined as
the room absorption (AB) added to the room demand in the same period last
year (SOLD(tA)). For this report, the equation can be rearranged to solve for
room absorption. This equation is an accounting identity and does not rely on
behavioral economics. It can be written as follows:
Equation 2.1
SOLD(t)=SOLD(t4)+AB(t) or AB(t)= SOLD(t)- SOLD(tA)
The next step to modeling demand is to determine the potential number of
hotel rooms that all hotel guests would demand. This potential demand is a
function of exogenous and endogenous variables that influence people's ease
and propensity of travel. For this model, three variables: real GDP,
enplanements and real average room rate, were presented in the above "Factors
Affecting Demand for Hotel Rooms" section.
First the demand for hotel rooms was shown to be positively correlated with
the economy (GDP). This relationship was illustrated in Charts 2.1 and 2.2 and
represents people's propensity for travel.
The exogenous variable, Enplanements, was presented in Chart 2.7 to be
positively correlated with demand and can be used to gauge the ease of travel.
Average room rate was explained to be negatively correlated with demand.
Decreasing the room rate was demonstrated as a means to increase the
demand for rooms.
Therefore, this potential number of hotel rooms that all hotel guests would
demand is an ideal target that is a function of current real Gross Domestic
Product (GDP(t)), current real average room rates (R (t)), and current domestic air
passengers (ENPLANE(t)) and can be designated by the variable SOLD.
Equation 2.2
SOLD (t)= ao-a 1R (t)+a 2GDP(t)+a 3EN PLAN E(t)
The coefficient ao determines the baseline number of rooms that would be
demanded, while a1, a2 and a3 determine the room demand decrease with
average room rate growth and the increase with GDP expansion or domestic air
travel increases.
If consumers adjusted their travel levels immediately to changes in room rate,
GDP or enplanements, this equation would be an adequate representation of
demand. But realistically, consumers do not immediately adjust their travel
consumption. For example, as the economy strengthens, some companies may
increase their sales trips in order to increase product sales, while other
companies adopt a "wait and see" attitude. Consequently, the number of rooms
sold adjusts over some time period from its present level (SOLD(t)) to the target
level (SOLD). For simplicity, it is assumed that a constant fractional adjustment
(@1) to rooms sold occurs each period until the target is attained. By rearranging
identity Equation 2.1, this adjustment process can be written as so:
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Equation 2.3
SOLD(t)-SOLD(t4)=AB(t)=T1 [SOLD (t)-SOLD(t-4)]
As mentioned previously, because of the seasonal fluctuations associated
with the lodging industry, better results are achieved if the number of room sold
this period is compared to the number of rooms sold in the same period one year
ago. In this way we are comparing like periods.
Equation 2.3 says that in each period, a fraction, T1, of hotel guests change
their amount of travel, from the previous amount to the new desired amount,
which in turn alters the number of rooms sold. After some number of periods
(depending on the magnitude of11), the actual number of rooms sold (SOLD(t))
will equal the target number of rooms sold (SOLD*(t)).
By substituting Equation 2.2 into Equation 2.3, a linear equation is created
whereby room absorption and the room demand gradually adjust to a target
defined by the Gross Domestic Product, the average room rate and the number
of domestic airline passengers.30
Equation 2.4
AB(t)= 11[ao-a1lR (t)+a 2GDP(t)+a 3EN PLAN E(t)]-T1 SOLD(tA)
Equation 2.4 determines how room absorption and room demand adjust to
reach the long run target room demand which is a function of the economy,
average room rates and domestic air travel. (The term within the brackets is
SOLD from Equation 2.2). If the demand shock was a one time occurrence
and the economy, average room rates and the number of domestic air
passengers subsequently remained fixed at a constant level, the number of
rooms sold (SOLD(t)) would ultimately equal the target rooms sold (SOLD (t))-
The results of the equation 2.4 regression using the national lodging
industry data are presented in Table 2.1.
30 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.12-9.
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Table 2.1
Dependent Variable SOLD (Rooms Sold) - Estimation by Least Squares
Quarterly Data From 1970:01 To 1994:04
Usable Observations 100 Degrees of Freedom 95
Centered R**2 0.987940 R Bar **2 0.987432
Uncentered R**2 0.999452 T x R**2 99.945
Mean of Dependent Variable 1482963.0000
Std Error of Dependent Variable 325216.7649
Standard Error of Estimate 36458.6528
Sum of Squared Residuals 1.26277e+011
Regression F(4,95) 1945.5860
Significance Level of F 0.00000000
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.516902
Q(25-0) 114.758337
Significance Level of Q 0.00000000
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif
1. Constant
2. R
3. GDP
4. ENPLANE
5. SOLD{4}
50222.1231
-7880.9657
2.5830e-007
1.0753e-003
0.4105
98715.9712
1683.6077
3.6251 e-008
1.3938e-003
0.0569
0.50875 0.61210435
-4.68100 0.00000947
7.12524 0.00000000
0.77148 0.44233912
7.21341 0.00000000
By entering the regression results into equation 2.4 and rearranging the terms,
Equation 2.5 is created.
Equation 2.5
AB(t)=0.5895[85194-13368R(t)+0.000000438GDP(t)+0.001 8ENPLANE(t)-SOLD(t4)I
The high R2 of 0.98794 in Table 2.1 demonstrates that statistically this model
is a good fit. The T-Statistic values for all variables except the number of
enplanements (ENPLANE) are significant. Actually, excluding enplanements,
the significance is to the 99% confidence level.
The insignificant T-statistic on enplanements suggests that the number of
rooms sold is not dependent on air travel. Since the aggregate United States
was used, which includes hotels, motels and the like, perhaps the automobile
would have been a better mode of transportation to investigate.
The significance of the T-statistic on GDP reinforces the theory that lodging
demand is primarily driven by the state of the general economy. The significant
* *4k-** * *4-4,* * * * * *41* * ** *-*** ********* ** *** ***** * **** * * * ***** **** ** *** **.** ** * 41 *
T-statistic on last year's number of rooms sold shows that decisions for this
period are made based on last years' data for the same period, not last quarters.
(The author did investigate this relationship and found yearly comparisons much
more robust than quarterly comparisons.)
The above room adjustment model suggests that in each year, the number of
rooms sold will move towards the equilibrium room demand at a rate of 0.5895.
This means that 58% of the adjustment will occur each year so the target
demand will be achieved in 1.72 years.
With regard to the average room rate, the room rate elasticity of demand is
calculated at -0.47 2. This means that for a 1 % increase in the real average
room rate, the number of rooms sold decreases only by 0.47%. These findings
are similar to, but slightly more elastic than, Coopers & Lybrand's price elasticity
of demand of -0.39.
The signs on the coefficients are all as expected. The real average rate is
negatively correlated with the number of rooms sold while the Gross Domestic
Product, the number of enplanements and the number of rooms sold in the same
period last year are positively correlated.
The total room absorption is now entered into Equation 2.1 and added to the
demand for the same period last year to determine a new total room demand
(SOLD(t)).
The next step to modeling demand is to determining the corresponding
average room rate equation. To do this, a second identity equation must be
presented. This equation defines the occupancy rate as a ratio of room demand
(SOLD(t)) to room supply (S(t)) in any period.
Equation 2.6
OC(t)=SOLD(t))/S(t)
31 {4} represents a four period lag in the data.
32 (13368*51.50)/(1462665.38.585) 
-For all elasticities, the mean value for the 26 year data
series were used for calculations.
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If the room supply is taken as given, the room demand will yield a stable
occupancy rate (OC) for each value of average room rate (R), GDP, and
enplanements (ENPLANE). Since the number of rooms sold has been solved for
in Equation 2.5, it can be entered into identity Equation 2.6 and the occupancy
rate can be solved for.
Previously, it was argued that the change in the real average room rate is
positively correlated with the occupancy rate (Chart 2.4). This means that if
occupancy increases due to demand, a higher room rate can be charged.
Alternatively, if occupancy begins to fall, the hotel operator reduces room rates in
an effort to halt the downward trend.
Inflation's peculiar influence on the real average room rate was also presented
(Chart 2.5). Historically, room rate inflation has been affected by inflation but has
been tempered by occupancy. In the forthcoming regression it will be shown that
inflation's overall effect on the real average room rate is negative. This means
that inflation inhibits the raising of room rates by hotel operators.
The next phase of modeling demand is to determine the equilibrium average
room rate that all hotel operators would be willing to accept. This room rate is an
ideal target that is a function of last year's occupancy rate (OC(t-4)) and inflation
rate(INF(t-4)) and can be designated by the variable R .
Equation 2.7
R(t=p1o+p 1 0 C(t-4y-92INF(t-4)
The coefficient po determines the baseline average room rate that would be
charged, while 1., and 2 determine the room rate increase with occupancy rate
growth and the decrease associated with inflation.
If hotel operators adjusted the room rate immediately to changes in the
occupancy rate and inflation, Equation 2.7 would suffice in determining the real
average room rate. But realistically, hotel operators do not immediately adjust
their room rate. A hotel operator may raise or lower the room rate with an
occupancy rate shock or wait to see if the shock will continue. An operator may
also opt to adjust only partially their room rates. Regardless, the average room
rate adjusts over some time period from its present level (R(t)) to the target level
(R*) for this is the rate hotel operators want to be at. For simplicity, it is assumed
that a constant fractional adjustment (r2) to the real average room rate occurs
each period until the target is attained. By again utilizing the format of identity
Equation 2.1, this room rate adjustment process can be written as so:
Equation 2.8
R(t)-R(i 4)*=AR(ty= T2[R (t)-R(t-4)]
As mentioned previously, because of the seasonal fluctuations associated
with the lodging industry, better results are achieved if the real average room
rate of this period is compared to the real average room rate in the same period
one year ago. In this way we are comparing like periods.
Equation 2.8 says that in each period a fraction, T2 , of hotel operators adjust
their real average room rate from the previous level to the new desired level
which in turn alters the average room rate. After some number of periods
(depending on the magnitude of 2), the actual real average room rate (R(t)) will
equal the target average room rate (R (t).
By substituting Equation 2.7 into Equation 2.8, a linear equation (2.9) is
created whereby the average room rate change and the average room rate
gradually settle at an equilibrium defined by the occupancy rate (OC(t.4))and
33inflation rate (INF(t4))
Equation 2.9
R (t)-R(t4 y=T2[Lo+[t1 OC(t.4)-p2NF(t.4)]-T2R(t-4)
Equation 2.9 determines how the change in the real average room rates and
the real average room rates adjust to reach the long run ideal average room rate
which is a function of the occupancy rate and inflation. (The term within the
brackets is R(t) from Equation 2.7).
33 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.12-9.
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The results of the Equation 2.9 regression using the national lodging industry
data are presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2
Dependent Variable R (Real Average Rate) - Estimation by Least Squares
Quarterly Data From 1970:01 To 1994:04
Usable Observations 100 Degrees of Freedom 96
Centered R**2 0.961116 R Bar **2 0.959901
Uncentered R**2 0.999471 T x R**2 99.947
Mean of Dependent Variable 51.864960145
Std Error of Dependent Variable 6.124128870
Standard Error of Estimate 1.226345987
Sum of Squared Residuals 144.37675016
Regression F(3,96) 790.9559
Significance Level of F 0.00000000
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.346323
Q(25-0) 303.845287
Significance Level of Q 0.00000000
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif
1. Constant -4.36022016 2.21630235 -1.96734 0.05203030
2. OC{4} 15.54706588 3.71891849 4.18053 0.00006422
3. INF{4} -11.88148271 4.76004036 -2.49609 0.01426194
4. R{4} 0.91690513 0.02204094 41.60009 0.00000000
By entering the regression results into equation 2.4 and rearranging the terms,
Equation 2.10 is created.
Equation 2.10
AR(t)=0.083[-52.53+187.3140C(t 4)-143.15INF(i 4)-R(t-4)
The high R2 of 0.96 in Table 2.2 demonstrates that statistically this model is a
good fit. The T-Statistic values for all variables are significant. In fact, all
variables are significant to a confidence level of 98%. The average room rate
adjustment model suggests that in each period, the average room rate moves
toward the target average room rate at a rate of .083. This is a very slow
adjustment and can be interpreted thus. All else equal, it will take over 12 years
for the real average room rate to adjust to the target room rate.
The slowness of this price adjustment shows that hotel operators do not
believe that rate changes are the answer to filling a hotel and are reluctant to
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alter them. This reinforces the price elasticity of demand calculation of 0.47
calculated from Table 2.1.
Therefore, there must be a reason that hotel operators do not dramatically
change rates to attract customers. The hotel operator must believe that there is
some hidden value for keeping a rate high and a room unoccupied.
One argument is that the vacant room has an option value. An option value is
the value associated with not renting a room now with the hope of renting it for a
higher price in the future. The slow adjustment process demonstrates that the
hotel operators value this component highly. The factors underlying the option
value are difficult to identify and are probably a combination of many random
variables. They may include predictions based on tourism projections, hotel
property reputation, the fear of starting a room rate war with the competition,
corporate policy limitations, fixed and variable expenses, etc. Regardless of the
option value's components, its influence on the operators makes them reluctant
to dramatically alter their room rates.
The room rate elasticity with regard to occupancy is 2.33. This means that for
a 1 % increase in occupancy the price increases by 2.3%. Using historic average
values for the United States lodging industry, the equation implies that the real
average room rate will head towards $58.34 3 in 1990 dollars.
The signs on the coefficients can be explained as thus. The occupancy rate
from last year is positively correlated with the average rate. If the occupancy is
increasing, the room rate can also be increased. The significance of the T-
statistic on last year's real average rate for the same period reiterates that the
industry is making its decisions based on last year's period data and not last
quarter's.
As discussed, inflation is negatively correlated with the real average room
rate. As inflation increases, the real room rate's value decreases.
34(187.314*0.63)/51.50
as (-52.53+(187.314*0.63)-(143.15*0.0559))
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Summary
The model to this point demonstrates how the average room rate determines
the room absorption, how the room absorption determines occupancy rates and
how occupancy rates determine the average room rate. The combination of
Equations 2.1 to 2.9 has created a demand model for the lodging industry that
works as follows: 36
First, given an average room rate, real GDP and the number of domestic air
passengers, Equations 2.4 eventually yields a stable (zero absorption) number of
rooms sold via identity Equation 2.1. Identity Equation 2.6 takes this stable
number of rooms sold and yields a stable occupancy rate. Equation 2.9 takes
this occupancy rate and adjusts room rates until they are stable. When the
room rates and the occupancy rate are the same in Equation 2.9 as they are in
Equation 2.8, then the market is at equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the average
rate yields travelers to demand a number of hotel rooms that yields an
occupancy rate, which in turn leads to the same stable value of room rates.
Second, if travel increases, the change in the number of rooms sold turns
positive, and with the given stock of hotel rooms, occupancy increases
(Equations 2.4 and 2.6). The increase in occupancy causes room rates to
increase (Equation 2.9). As the room rate rises, room absorption decreases.
Eventually, a new, stable equilibrium is reached with a higher level of room rates,
no change in the number of rooms sold and a higher occupancy rate.
Third, if the stock of guest rooms increases, occupancy rates fall and this
causes the real room rates to fall (Equations 2.4 and 2.6). Falling room rates
cause an increase in the number of rooms sold (Equation 2.9), which in turn,
increases the occupancy rate. Eventually, a new stable equilibrium is reached
where the real average room rates are lower, the room absorption remains
constant, and the occupancy rate is lower.
36 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.12-15.
40
Quantitatively, for the room sold adjustment model, the real average rate was
shown to be negatively correlated with room absorption while GDP and
enplanements were shown to be positive. The room sold adjustment model was
determined to adjust slowly towards the target demand at a rate of 58% per year.
Additionally, the room rate elasticity of demand was found to be only -0.47 which
demonstrates that the quantity demanded is not sensitive to changes in the real
average room rate.
For the real average rate model, the occupancy rate was shown to be
positively correlated with the change in real average room rates while inflation
was shown to be negatively correlated. The rate adjustment factor was
calculated at 8.3%, which is very slow. The occupancy elasticity with respect to
price was shown to be 2.3 which demonstrates that price is sensitive to changes
in the occupancy rate.
This model also suggests that any shocks to the real Gross Domestic Product
will also cause a very slow change to the real average room rate.
These elasticities suggest that for changes in the real Gross Domestic
Product, the room absorption and real average room rate adjusts slowly.
CHAPTER 3
Supply
This chapter is devoted to the subject of supply for the U.S. lodging industry.
In the first section, the 26 year time series data is presented and the
determinants of supply are identified. Interaction between endogenous and
exogenous variables is examined as is the interrelationship between
endogenous variables. With this information, an econometric model for supply is
subsequently developed. The time series is then processed and the chapter
concludes with an analysis of the results.
Factors affecting the supply of hotel rooms
As was demand, national hotel room supply is also a function of many
different variables. The most prominent effects come from financial and
governmental influences but other factors such as obsolescence, economic,
geographic, environmental and technological must also be considered. The
issue at hand is whether it is possible to develop an econometric model that will
accurately forecast supply as these variables change.
Financial and Governmental
Hotels are expensive forms of real estate to develop. Consequently, hotel
development is highly dependent on the availability of capital. Ignoring the
straight loan which has been in existence for eons, various alternative methods
of financing have been created in the last forty years to make lodging financing
readily available.
In 1946, both the Sheraton and Hilton hotel companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange 37. These were the first ventures into the public equity market
for the lodging industry. This method demonstrated that the stock market was a
3 Stephen Rushmore, Hotel Investments, A Guide for Lenders and Owners, (Warren, Gorham
& Lamont. Boston and New York 1990), p.2-17.
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viable choice for financing lodging expansion development. This financing
method has proliferated since the mid-1 960's and publicly traded hotel
corporations are listed worldwide on most major exchanges.
In the 1950's, accelerated depreciation combined with interest deductions
created the syndication deal3 . The high depreciation and interest charges
associated with hotel properties could be used to offset income and thus reduce
taxes. For that reason, a large amount of hotel development was now being
financed with "tax-driven" deals. The syndication deal, for the most part, ended
with the advent of the 1986 Tax Reform Act which seriously curtailed the
aforementioned benefits.
In the latter half of the 1980's, the deregulation of the Savings & Loan Banks
made borrowing very easy. With deregulation, lending for high risk real estate
developments increased dramatically. The number of banks increased due to a
relaxing of the industry's barriers to entry. Background checks on lenders were
eased. Minimum balances of deposits in banks were relaxed. Government
scrutiny was minimal.
Additionally, banks were also trying to stem the disintermediation of funds into
vehicles such as mutual funds. Commercial banks started to compete with the
Savings & Loan banks on lending to hotel projects. Altogether, banks were
lending funds at almost unprecedented terms.
This financing fervor led to banks making loans on real estate projects without
understanding the associated risks. Many real estate projects were built with no
feasibility studies or due diligence. Loan to Value Ratios exceeded 80% and
could sometimes reach 100%. Hotel developers and investors reaped these
benefits as did developers and investors in other real estate sectors. In actuality,
from 1984 to 1989, bank loans in all categories increased by $512 billion. Of
39
this amount, real estate accounted for $367 billion or 72% of the increase
38 Stephen Rushmore, Hotel Investments, A Guide for Lenders and Owners, (Warren, Gorham
& Lamont. Boston and New York 1990), p.2-17.
39David E. Arnold and L. Clark Blynn, "Industry Insights: Welcome to the Better Part of the
1990's", Trends In the Hotel Industry, (Pannell Kerr Forster, 1881), p. 3
This lending continued until the late 1980's when loans began to default in
record numbers. The collateral securing the loan was insufficient to recoup the
loan money which led to the draining of banks' assets. The Savings & Loan
banks' asset/liability matching problem grew geometrically which led the banks to
recall other outstanding loans. This, in turn, caused more hotel development
loan defaults. The compounding of real estate debt led to the failure of many
Savings & Loan banks. This collapse curtailed real estate lending which
ultimately resulted in a temporary cessation in hotel development. It is only
recently that banks have begun to warily lend for hotel development.
In the 1970's and again in the mid-1990's, the REIT (Real Estate Investment
Trust) structure was able to attract large amounts of investment which was to be
utilized in part for hotel development. The REIT structure allows for ownership of
real estate assets in the form of shares. The major benefit of the REIT structure
is the avoidance of taxation at the corporate level.
At the end of 1994, there were six public hotel REITs consisting of one
hundred and six properties having an equity capitalization of $721 million. Also
at this time, there were seven companies in registration for REITs consisting of
two hundred and thirty-six properties with an equity capitalization of $1.2 billion.
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Since this period, the hotel REIT market has been on an unofficial hiatus while
complications in the REIT structure are reanalyzed. The hotel REIT is more
complicated than the REITs of other types of real estate due to conflict of interest
issues. Under REIT laws, hotel income is considered unqualified, hence the
REIT could be taxed on this income. To qualify for the REIT status, a complex
lease structure has evolved whereby the REIT leases the hotel to a management
company pursuant to a participating lease. Lease payments are then made
based on gross revenues. The conflict that has arisen concerns the lessee
being affiliated or unaffiliated with the REIT.
40 Jonathan Lift, "Hotel REITs- Under Siege?", Salomon Brothers Equity Real Estate
Securities, November 8, 1994, p.3
Another popular financing method of the early 1980's was the Master Limited
Partnership. Master Limited Partnerships are extended partnerships that cover a
broad base of the company's assets as opposed to just one property. The
Master Limited Partnerships were usually publicly traded which allowed for a
large ownership base while still allowing for control by the management company
(usually the general partner). Before the 1986 tax changes, these partnerships
were free of corporate income taxes and dividends were paid out of pretax
income. Since, the 1986 tax change, the popularity of this financing method has
diminished.
Another trend in the late 1980's and early 1990's was the purchase of hotels
by foreign entities. These properties were usually "trophy" properties in the
deluxe category. This trend was compounded by the weak U.S. dollar on the
foreign exchange. This influx of capital was in turn used to fund new
development.
Because the majority of hotel properties are built with financing, the ability to
arrange affordable financing, regardless of the source, is essential to
development. In reality, this ability to arrange financing may outweigh demand
as the driving force behind development. In Chart 3.1, it is evident that
development tends to synchronize real GDP with a one and a half year lag. In
recessing economies, where financing is more difficult, development tends to
decrease. Alternatively, in expanding economies, development increases due to
the availability of financing. The recessions of the mid-1 970's and early 1990's
are clearly mimicked by a decrease in development while the peaks of the early
1970's and mid-1980's are marked by a corresponding increase.
There are a few periods when this correlation does seem contradicted. From
1977-1979, the GDP was high but completions plummeted. This was probably
due to the extreme overbuilding in the lodging market in the early 1970's. In
1981 and 1982, completions were at a moderate level while GDP was
decreasing. Interest rates were at a historical high at this time decreasing the
GDP. Alternatively, hotel occupancies and room rates were high spurring
development. The two opposing forces resulted in a period of short term
moderate room completions. In 1993 and 1994 the GDP was increasing yet
room completions were minimal. This is probably related to the difficulty of
financing hotel projects in the early 1990's. Because of all the defaulted loans
from the late 1980's and early 1990's, banks were reluctant to lend money for
lodging projects.
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Interest rates, though related to the state of the economy, should be
investigated separately. When interest rates are low, financing is more available
for development because of higher returns. When interest rates are high, the
spread between hotel development returns and treasury note returns are
decreased and financing is more difficult. Chart 3.2 illustrates the negative
correlation that exists between interest rate levels (10 year Treasury Note rates41
are used as a proxy throughout this study) and changes in supply. In the late
1970's and early 1980's, when interest rates were very high, development was
minimal. Alternatively in the mid 1980's, when interest rates were very low,
development increased dramatically.
41 This rate is as listed in the Annual Statistical Digest published by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
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This finance driven development, versus demand driven development, has
had many historical, negative implications on the lodging industry.
Referring to the lodging industry real estate cycle description in Chapter 1,
increased development with a constant demand automatically reduces the
occupancy rate. Later it was shown that a decrease in occupancy is matched by
a corresponding room rate drop. Therefore, room completions should move
inverse with the average room rate.
The positive relationship between room completions and the change in the
average rate is illustrated in Chart 3.3 as having a two year lag. Using the last
economic cycle as an example, the ease of financing properties from 1983 to
1988 gave rise to excessive lodging development. Without the corresponding
demand increase, room rates declined in real terms by almost 10% and achieved
a low in early 1991. It was not until the end of 1992 that development came to a
virtual standstill, that demand was able to exceed supply and room rates began
to rise.
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In Chapter 2 the interdependence of room rate and occupancy were
discussed. Again, if demand is held constant, occupancy rates will fall with
increased supply because the guest has more property substitutes to choose
from.
Referring to Chart 3.4, the highest occupancies can be observed in 1970 at
72%. At this time, the prime rate was at a record high which made financing new
projects unfeasible. Therefore, as demand increased with less available supply,
occupancy rose.
This trend due to high interest rates was again repeated in the early 1980's.
These interest rates made financing expensive which decreased development.
With little new supply, demand absorbed the vacant space and increased
occupancy. The deregulation of financing in 1983 caused a development glut
which subsequently led to a steady decline in the occupancy. The tax reform law
of 1988, made financing difficult again and development virtually ceased. Due to
the inherent lag associated with development, new supply continued to enter the
market for approximately one and a half years more. This additional supply
further decreased the occupancy rate to a low of 56% in 1990/1991. After 1991,
demand finally exceeded supply and occupancy rates began to rise.
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Obsolescence
For the hotel investor, the economic life of a hotel property is a major factor
when considering development. As the hotel stock ages, it can become obsolete
both functionally and aesthetically.
Functional obsolescence is related to changing public opinion as to
acceptable accommodations. For example, in many deluxe hotels, the
availability of a first rate health club has become standard. Hotels lacking this
facility may have a difficult time competing in the market. Usually, functional
deficiencies can be corrected, but this correction may prove to be prohibitively
expensive.
Aesthetically, older hotels require more money to maintain their
competitiveness. Renovations of public spaces and guest rooms are periodically
required. Again, these renovations and maintenance fees may become
prohibitively expensive.
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Compared to other forms of real estate such as office buildings or shopping
centers, hotels are expensive properties to operate. For hotels, the maintenance
costs, product marketing and guest services can equal 80% of gross sales.
These high expenses leave only a small margin for debt service and profit.
Ultimately, for some hotels, there comes a time when the expenses outweigh
the revenue from the property and any renovations that could be made, would be
impossible to recover with the potential cash flows. At this point the logical
course of business is either to demolish or abandon the structure. For this
thesis, this action will be referred to as scrappage.
Chart 3.5 shows that historically, there is a negative correlation between room
scrappage 4 2 and real interest rates4 3 . If real interest rates are low, properties
and cash flows have a higher value due to discounting. With a poorly performing
property this is a more difficult goal to meet, hence scrappage increases. If real
interest rates are low, the value of the property is easier to attain thus scrappage
becomes unwarranted.
Additionally at times of low real interest rates, renovations are more costly,
and the potential for recovering these increased costs through the room revenue
diminishes.
42 This identity was calculated based on data provided by F.W. Dodge via Coopers & Lybrand.
43 Real interest rates are defined as the difference between the 10 year Treasury Note rate and
the inflation rate.
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Chart 3.5
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A related variable to real interest rates would be the level of real average
room rates. If real average room rates are high or increasing, probably due to
low inflation, the revenue or ability to earn revenue increases. This additional
revenue increases the likelihood that a hotel is profitable and the potential for
renovation expense recovery increases. Alternatively, if real average room rates
are decreasing the likelihood of covering expenses and recovering a capital
improvement expense decreases and makes scrappage a more attractive
alternative. (Chart 3.6)
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It is important to note that true hotel room scrappage has never truly been
monitored. Historically, it was calculated endogenously by taking the room stock
this year and subtracting last year's room stock and this period's room
completions. Both the room stock and room completions are reported as
historical data. Regardless, in many years, room scrappage was calculated as a
negative number. This is impossible and must be credited to some error in the
data. The error could be attributable to the following inconsistencies.
First, R. S. Means company reports data on square footage of room starts in
each period. Their information is based on extensive surveys. From this data,
relative completion dates are calculated through an algorithm. An error could
arise with calculating the completion times of projects. Some projects may be
delayed while others are completed ahead of schedule. The R. S. Means data
may miss these discrepancies.
With regard to the room stock, this data was based on survey information from
Smith Travel Research. It is possible that some properties were missed in the
survey thus skewing the total room stock data. Furthermore, new room stock
due to completions or missing room stock due to scrappage may be missed in a
period and reported in a subsequent period. This reporting error would also
skew the data.
Despite the errors, the negative numbers for room scrappage were used to
determine all stochastic equations.
Economic
As stated in Chapter 2, the economy (Gross Domestic Product) is the driving
force behind people's propensity to travel and the two are positively correlated.
Therefore, it is logical to assume that scrappage and the economy are negatively
correlated. If the economy is in recession, fewer people are traveling, properties
are earning less revenue and scrappage becomes more attractive. Alternatively,
in expanding economies, the scrappage alternative becomes less attractive
because more people are traveling and hotels have a greater potential to earn
revenue.
Historically, Chart 3.7 shows that the scrappage and the change in real GDP
were negatively correlated until the late 1980's and again after 1992. The
fluctuations in the scrappage in the late 1980's and early 1990's are probably
due to the 1987 tax law change and Savings & Loan bank crisis. With the
massive number of foreclosures, hotels were periodically auctioned off creating
by the RTC44. This timing influenced the new defaulted portfolio owner's ability
to assess their new property holdings and exercise their scrappage option.
44 Resolution Trust Corporation
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From Chart 3.8, it is apparent that scrappage and room completions are
positively correlated. This is logical for as new stock enters the market, the 
older
stock has problems competing. Additionally, some owners may decide that
demolishing their existing property and building a new hotel may be more
profitable. With demand constant, the guest prefers a newer property rather than
an older property. Thus, it makes it more difficult for older properties to compete
in the marketplace and the scrappage option gains merit. Room completions
and scrappage seem highly correlated until 1983 and again after 1992. For the
nine years in between, the correlation seems nonexistent. This is probably due
to the tax act of 1983 and booming economy. In 1988, the new tax law changed
the whole development market bringing new development to a halt.
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Environmental
Increasing environmental regulations make constructing and operating hotels
more expensive. Items such as the installation of waste water treatment plants,
non-CFC air-conditioning, surcharges on public utilities during peak hours make
hotel development and operation more expensive than other forms of real estate.
Additionally, new regulations increase the chance that existing hotels are forced
into expensive retrofit projects in order to comply.
Technological
Technology's implication on construction should be briefly addressed. A
major determiner of real estate market cyclicality is the lag between room starts45
and room completions*6. It is this lag that over-emphasizes the amplitude of the
cycle. As construction technology improves, the lag decreases and the
45Room Starts is defined as the number of hotel guest rooms began each period. This
information was provided by Coopers & Lybrand. Coopers & Lybrand receives this information
from F.W. Dodge (a division of McGraw Hill) and converts the square footage reporting into a
guest room count.
46 Room Completions is defined as the number of hotel guest rooms completed in each period.
This information was provided by Coopers & Lybrand. Coopers & Lybrand receives this
information from F.W. Dodge (a division of McGraw Hill) and converts the square footage
reporting into a guest room count.
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frequency between cycles decreases, theoretically resulting in a quicker steady
state.
The present one and a half year construction lag time, as shown in Chart 3.9,
also means that different market conditions may exist at the beginning of
construction as do at the end of construction. The longer the lag between start
and completion, the higher the volatility and greater the risk of market fluctuation.
It is important to emphasize that once the development option is exercised, it is
near impossible and very expensive to halt. As the lag time decreases due to
technological advancement, the risk associated with construction will decrease.
Chart 3.9
ROOM STARTS VS COMPLETIONS
50,000
45,000
40,000
35,0000
0 30,000
o 25,000
W 20,000 ',
M 15,000
Z 10,000
5,000
0
a0 a- a- a- a a a a a N- N- 0 a0 a0 a 0 a0 a0 a0 a0 a0 a a a a a
YEAR
ROOM STARTS ..---. ROOM COMPLETIONS
The Model
As stated in Chapter 2, a stock/flow modeling approach argues that in the
short term, the occupancy and average room rate adjust to equate the hotel
room demand to the existing stock of rooms. Alternatively, adjustments, such as
new construction or demolition, to the rooms available occur slowly over time
and often with a lag. The room supply adjustments respond to the average room
rates determined in the market's short run equilibrium.
47 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.10-1.
The following section was developed using the econometric modeling
techniques presented in William C. Wheaton and Denise DiPasquale's
forthcoming textbook, The Economics of Real Estate Markets.
Determinants of Supply
Supply (room stock) in the lodging industry is defined as the number of rooms
available during a given period48. Previously, it was stated that the lodging
industry adjusts supply slowly and with a lag. The question is how is this supply
determined and adjusted?
Lodging supply this period (S (t)) can be defined as the stock of rooms in the
previous period (S(t-1)), plus this period's completions (C(t)), minus this period's
scrappage (SCRAP(t)). This equation is an accounting identity and does not rely
on behavioral economics. It can be written as follows:
Equation 3.1
S(t>=S(t-1)+C(t>-SCRAP(t)
To continue the supply side modeling, the number of room completions and
scrappage must therefore be determined.
As was done in the demand side equations, it can be assumed that there is
number of new completions that all developers would like to bring to the market
that is a function of certain endogenous and exogenous variables.
Furthermore, as shown in Chart 3.9, the lag between room starts and
completions is approximately one and a half years. This means that market
oriented decisions are being made 1 to 2 years before any new stock is actually
added to supply.
To begin the development process, a developer first needs to analyze the
amount of current stock and the amount of stock coming on line from other
developers. With this total stock estimate combined with the conclusions from
Chapter 2 that absorption and real average rates adjust slowly, an assessment
48 In the case of this study, a period is defined as a quarter of a year
of the future market can be made. If the market is favorable, financing of the
potential project must then be considered to determine feasibility.
To model construction (room completions), five variables were identified as
having significant influence over room completions. They are the existing total
room stock, the real average rate, interest rates, room rate inflation, and room
absorption.
First, the endogenous variable of available rooms (S) should be negatively
correlated with construction. As was shown, occupancy tends to lead room
completions with a lag. If occupancy is decreasing due to an increasing room
stock, room completions will follow this trend after a lag. Logically, the larger the
room stock, the less new rooms that are needed.
As was described in Chapter 1, properties are valued from cash flows which
are primarily determined by real average room rates (R). If room rates are high,
then the potential that the new project will make money improves.
Moreover, not only should room rates be considered but also their future
trends. With the time lag of construction, the trend of real average room rates
(R%DIFF) must also be considered. For example, forecasting a high average
room rate in two years and ignoring the fact that it will plummet in the third year
could lead to a costly mistake. An upward trending room rate should lead to
increased construction. As was shown in Chart 3.4, the change in real average
room rates and room completions is positive.
The room absorption (AB) of all vacant room stock must be considered. This
includes present, vacant room stock, the planned new completions by other
developers and the proposed project. If absorption is increasing, then there is a
greater chance that the new room stock will be occupied. If room absorption is
decreasing, then there is a diminishing chance that new room stock will be
occupied. Therefore, a positive correlation between the changes in room
absorption and room completions can be expected.
Finally, interest rates (TNOTES) must be considered when planning any
development. As discussed in the "Financial" influences section above, if
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interest rates are low, the returns on hotel projects are more attractive and
financing is readily available. Alternatively, if interest rates are high, the returns
required from a lodging project is more difficult to justify and credit availability
diminishes. This leads to a fall in construction rates. Therefore, a negative
correlation as shown in Chart 3.2, is expected between room completions and
interest rates49.
Collectively, the potential number of room completions becomes an ideal
target that is a function of the existing room stock, the real average room rate,
the trend of the real average room rate, interest rates, and room absorption; and
can be designated by the variable C .
Equation 3.2
C*(t)=Po-PlS(t.)+P 2R (t-8)- 3TNOTES(t-4) +p4R%DIFF(t. 4)+PSAB(tA)
The coefficient Po determines the baseline number of rooms that would be
constructed. P1, P2, p3, p4 and p5 determine the room completions increase with
respects to average rate, average rate inflation, and absorption growth and the
completions decrease with respect to increases in the room stock and interest
rates.
The variables are lagged based on when the developer considers the market
influences in his decision process5*. It is interesting to note that real interest
rates have a two year lag as shown in Chart 3.3.
As was done for the demand side model, construction is determined as an
adjustment model. If developers could adjust their construction levels
immediately to changes in demand or interest rates this equation would be an
adequate representation of construction. But realistically, developers do not
immediately adjust their construction level. For example, as real average room
rates increase, developers do not immediately adjust their construction level.
4 10 year treasury notes are used as a proxy for interest rates.
50 These lags were chosen for they produced the highest R2 with coefficients of the correct
signs.
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Some may start to build more while others adopt a "wait and see" attitude to see
if the trend continues.
Consequently, the number of rooms completed adjusts over some time period
from its present level (C(t)) to the target level (C). For simplicity, it is assumed
that a constant fractional adjustment (T3) to room completions occurs each period
until the target is attained. By again using identity Equation 2.1, this adjustment
process can be written as so:
Equation 3.3
C(t)-C(t 4)=AC (t)= T3[C (t- C(tA)]
As mentioned previously, because of the seasonal fluctuations associated
with the lodging industry, better results are achieved if the number of room sold
this period is compared to the number of rooms sold in the same period one year
ago. In this way we are comparing like periods.
Equation 3.3 says that in each period, a fraction, T3 , of developers change
their amount of construction (room completions), from the previous amount to the
new desired amount. This, in turn, alters the number of rooms completed. After
some number of periods (depending on the magnitude of T3), the actual number
of rooms completed (C(t)) will equal the target number of rooms completed (C*(t)).
By substituting Equation 3.2 into Equation 3.3, a linear equation is created
whereby the change in room completions and room completions gradually adjust
to a target defined by the total room stock, the real average rate, interest rates,
room rate inflation and room absorption.
Equation 3.4
C(t)-C(t4)=T3[o-P1 S(t-4)+P2R(t-8)-P 3TNOTES(t4) +P4R%DIFF(t-4)+AB(t-4)]-T 3C(tA)
Equation 3.4 determines how the change in room completions and room
completions adjust to reach the long run target completions which is a function of
the total room stock, the real average rate, interest rates, room rate inflation and
51 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.12-9.
room absorption. (The term within the brackets is C(t) from Equation 3.2). If the
shock to construction was a one time occurrence such as an increase in demand
(AB increases) and the room stock, average room rate, interest rates, and room
rate inflation remained fixed at a constant level, the number of rooms completed
(C(t)) would ultimately equal the target number of rooms completed (C (t)).
The results of the Equation 3.3 regression using the national lodging industry
data are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
Dependent Variable C (Rooms Completed) - Estimation by Least Squares
Quarterly Data From 1971:01 To 1994:04
Usable Observations 96 Degrees of Freedom 89
Centered R**2 0.866765 R Bar **2 0.857783
Uncentered R**2 0.978578 T x R**2 93.943
Mean of Dependent Variable 22256.617409
Std Error of Dependent Variable 9793.092234
Standard Error of Estimate 3693.135483
Sum of Squared Residuals 1213893222.8
Regression F(6,89) 96.4991
Significance Level of F 0.00000000
Durbin-Watson Statistic 0.457816
Q(24-0) 162.390113
Significance Level of Q 0.00000000
Variable Coeff Std Error T-Stat Signif
1. Constant -29792.26866 4607.80945 -6.46560 0.00000001
2. S{4} -0.02584 0.00330 -7.84131 0.00000000
3. R{8} 2056.56004 272.87893 7.53653 0.00000000
4. TNOTES{4} -52835.35578 24323.93994 -2.17215 0.03250248
5. R%DIFF{4} 79869.18697 15817.75294 5.04934 0.00000234
6. AB{4} 0.04479 0.00751 5.96783 0.00000005
7. C{4) 0.351-20 0.07424 4.73090 0.00000835
Equation 3.5
AC(t)0.6488[-45919-0.0 39 8 S(t-4>+ 3 169.79R(t-8)-81435.5TNOTES(t 4)
+123102.94R%DIFF(t-4)+0.069AB(t-4)-C(t. 4)]
The R 2 of 0.866765 in Table 3.1 demonstrates that statistically this model has
a fairly good fit (i.e. approximately 87% of the room completions data can be
explained by the independent variables). The T-Statistic values for all variables
are significant. All the variables are significant to the 96% confidence level. If
the variable for treasury notes (TNOTES) is excluded, the remaining variables
are significant to the 99% confidence level.
The above room completions adjustment model suggests that in each year
almost two thirds (64.88%) of the difference between desired and actual
construction will made up.
The room rate elasticity of construction is calculated to be 7.452. This means
that for a 1 % change in room rate, the construction rate will increase 7.4%. This
elasticity is only slightly higher than the 7.3 elasticity reported by Coopers &
Lybrand.
The increase in construction also increases the total room stock. As the
higher real average room rate spurs construction activity the growing room stock
acts as a brake slowing it. With regard to supply, the price elasticity is 1.7853
This means that a 1 % increase in the real average room rate will result in
1.78%54 more total room stock.
The signs on the room supply (S) coefficient is negative which means that the
larger the existing supply, the more difficult absorption of vacant rooms will be
and the less desirable completions are. With regard to interest rates, the sign on
the TNOTES coefficient is negative. This means that the lower interest rates are
the easier it is to get financing for development. As interest rates increase the
ability to arrange financing decreases and development decreases.
Using historical averages of the data series, C* is equal to 23,224 room
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completions per period
If the market were depressed, at what real average room rate would C* go to
zero? With zero absorption and all other variables at historic average values, a
real average room rate of $44.17 would bring C* to zero. Alternatively, if room
52 (3169.79*51.5)/22028.13788
3 (2056.56*51.50)/(0.02584*2305322.41)
54 The mean values for the 26 year data series were used for calculations.
55 -45919-(0.0398*2305322)+(3169.79*51.50)-(81435.5*0.08612)+(123102.94*0.01269)
+(0.069*44950)
56 R=(45919+(.0398*2305322)+(81435*0.08612)-(123102.94*0.01269)-
(0.069*44950))/3169.79
completions57 was exactly matching room demand, the real average rate would
settle at $58.3558
The final model to determine on the supply side is that for scrappage. As
described in the section on economic obsolescence, scrappage is dependent on
a property's ability to have a positive cash flow. Cash flow depends on variables
such as the room rate, interest rates and inflation, competition and the state of
the economy.
First, as stated in the demand section in Chapter 2, the economy is the main
determiner of people's propensity to travel. If the economic trend59 is positive,
more people travel, occupancy rises and properties have more of a chance for a
positive cash flow. With a higher cash flow, the scrappage option makes less
economic sense so scrappage decreases. Hence, as demonstrated in Chart 3.7,
the economy and increases in the economy should be negatively correlated with
scrappage.
The scrappage option depends on the cash flow of the property. If there is
insufficient cash flow, scrappage becomes the viable alternative. As stated
previously, lodging cash flows are based on room rates. If room rates are high,
the property has a better chance of a positive cash flow, and vice versa.
Therefore, a negative correlation as shown in Chart 3.5, is expected of real
average room rates.
Another consideration is the new completions entering the market. The more
new properties that enter the market, the more difficult it is for the older
properties to compete. Occupancies decrease, cash flow decreases and the
scrappage alternative becomes more feasible. As demonstrated in Chart 3.7,
room completions, in general, should be positively correlated with scrappage.
Finally, the value of and ability to renovate older properties must be
considered. Low real interest rates capitalize properties at a higher value. This
57 Historic average of room completions: 44,590
58 R=(45919+(.0398*2305322)+(81435*0.08612)-(123102.94*0.01269)-(0.069*44950)-
44950)/3169.79
59 GDP is used as a proxy for the economy.
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higher value is more difficult to maintain with present room rates hence
scrappage becomes an acceptable alternative. Scrappage and real interest rates
should be negatively correlated.
Accordingly, the number of rooms to scrap can be determined as a function
of the change in the economy, real average room rates, the number of room
completions and real interest rates, and can be designated by the variable
SCRAP.
Equation 3.6
SCRAP(t)=ao-a1GDP%DIFF-a 2R (t4)+a3C(t)+a 4REALRATE(t-4)
The coefficient ao determines the baseline number of rooms that would be
scrapped, while a1, a2 , a3 and a4 determine the decrease in room scrappage with
respect to economic inflation and room rate growth and the scrappage increase
with respect to construction and real rate increases.
The variables are lagged based on when hotel owners consider the market
influences in their decision process60.
The results of the Equation 3.5 regression using the national lodging industry
data are presented in Table 3.2.
60 These lags were chosen for they produced the highest R2 with coefficients of the correct
signs.
Table 3.2
Dependent Variable SCRAP - Estimation by Least Squares
Quarterly Data From 1970:01 To 1994:04
Usable Observations 100 Degrees of Freedom 95
Centered R**2 0.638690 R Bar **2 0.623477
Uncentered R**2 0.814645 T x R**2 81.464
Mean of Dependent Variable 6321.7481477
Std Error of Dependent Variable 6521.1122901
Standard Error of Estimate 4001.4485913
Sum of Squared Residuals 1521101128.7
Regression F(4,95) 41.9831
Significance Level of F 0.00000000
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.083435
Q(25-0) 117.493867
Significance Level of Q 0.00000000
Variable
1. Constant
2. GDP%DIFF
3. R{4}
4. C
5. REALRATE{4}
Coeff
25145.29388
-63491.12857
-486.81195
0.40431
-41156.594
Std Error
4014.80746
18074.47071
80.33039
0.04518
14793.28658
T-Stat
6.26314
-3.51275
-6.06012
8.94865
-2.78211
Signif
0.00000001
0.00068077
0.00000003
0.00000000
0.00651450
Equation 3.7
SCRAP(t)=25145.29388-63491.12857GDP%DIFF(t)-486.811 9 5 R(tA)+0. 4 04 3 1 C(t)-
41156.594REALRATE (tA)
The R2 of 0.638690 in Table 3.2 demonstrates that statistically this model has a
reasonable fit (i.e. approximately 63% of the scrappage data can be explained
by the independent variables). The T-Statistic values for all variables are
significant. All the variables are significant to the 99% confidence level.
The four period lag (1 year) on the real average rate and real interest rate
variables is interesting for it says that part of the decision to scrap hotel rooms is
based on previous market conditions.
The price elasticity of scrappage is -3.92 . This means for a 1 % increase in
the real average room rate, scrappage declines by 3.92%.
61 Price Elasticity of Scrappage = (51.50*-486.81195)/ 6396
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At what room rate would scrappage cease altogether? Using the historical
means of the 26 year data series, the real average room rate would have to
increase to $64.086 for scrappage to cease.
Summary
Chapter 3 demonstrates how the room stock determines the level of room
completions, how the room completions determine scrappage, and how
scrappage and room completions together determine the room stock. The
combination of Equations 3.1 to 3.6 has created a supply model for the lodging
industry that works as follows: 63
First, given a stock of hotel rooms, the real average room rate, interest rates,
real average room rate inflation and room absorption, Equations 3.4 eventually
yields a stable number of rooms completed. Equation 3.6 takes this completion
level and combines it with real GDP inflation, real average room rates and the
real interest rate to determine scrappage. The scrappage and room completions
combined yield a new level of room stock in identity Equation 3.1. This new
room stock is then used to determine occupancy rates back in Equation 2.6.
Quantitatively, with regard to the completion adjustment model, the existing
room stock and interest rates were shown to be negatively correlated with the
change in room completions while the real average room rate, room rate
inflation, and room absorption were shown to be positive. The room completions
adjustment model suggests that in each period 64.88% of the difference
between desired and actual construction will made up. The room rate elasticity
of construction was calculated at 7.4 which demonstrates that the level of
construction is very sensitive to price fluctuations. Furthermore, the room rate
elasticity with regard to supply was calculated to be 1.78. This suggests that the
total room stock is also sensitive to changes in the real average room rate.
62 R=(-25145.29388+(63491.12857*0.02538)-(0.40431 *22028)+(41156.594*0.03022))/-
486.81195
6 Denise DiPasquale and William C. Wheaton, The Economics of Real Estate Markets,
(Prentice Hall 1995), p.12-15.
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For scrappage, the real GDP inflation rate, real average room rates and real
interest rates were shown to be negatively correlated while room completions
was demonstrated as positive. The room rate elasticity of scrappage was
calculated at -3.92 which indicates that scrappage is very sensitive to room rate
changes.
67
CHAPTER 4
Forecasting
Introduction
The two identities and two stochastic equations from Chapter 2 combined with
the one identity and two stochastic equations from Chapter 3 constitute a full
stock/flow model for the United States lodging industry. When combined, they
work as follows.
First, given total room stock, a real average room rate, a forecast of real GDP
and a forecast of domestic airline passengers, Equations 2.4 eventually
determines the level of room absorption. Equation 2.1 takes this room
absorption and determines the total room demand (number of rooms sold) for
this period by adding it to the total room demand of the same period last year.
Identity Equation 2.6 takes this new number of rooms sold and calculates an
occupancy rate given a total stock of space. Equation 2.9 takes this occupancy
rate and combines it with an inflation rate forecast, which together adjust the real
average room rate. Using Equation 2.1's methodology, the real average room
rate is updated by adding the change in the real average room rate to the real
average room rate last year.
In Equation 3.4, this real average room rate is combined with a stock of rooms
(total supply), rent inflation, the change in demand (room absorption), and a
forecast of interest rates to determine the change in the number of rooms
completed (construction). Again, the methodology of Equation 2.1 is employed
and the present room completions level is updated by adding the change in
completions to the number of completions in the same period last year. The
completions are combined with the previously determined real average room
rate, real GDP inflation (determined from the forecast of GDP) and a real interest
rate (determined from the forecasts of inflation and interest rates) to calculate the
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total amount of room scrappage (demolition) in Equation 3.6. This scrappage
level is combined with the previously determined room completions to update the
total room stock in identity Equation 3.1. This new room stock is then used to
update the occupancy rate in identity Equation 2.6 and the number of room
completions in Equation 3.4.
Many of the independent variables have been lagged to demonstrate when
they have the greatest influence over the dependent variable and to avoid
simultaneity in equations.
The model operates recursively starting in the first forecast period, 1995 Q1.
In this period, all endogenous variables are known.
In the following section, two forecast scenarios will be presented and
analyzed. The first scenario, Scenario (A), is a base case forecasting
conservative real GDP and enplanements (ENPLANE) growth. Interest rates
(TNOTES) and Inflation (INF) were projected to remain constant at today's
levels.
The second scenario, Scenario (B), introduces a recession and subsequent
recovery into the economy (real GDP) starting in 1997 Q3. Enplanement,
interest rate and inflation rate forecasts remain the same as they were in
Scenario (A).
Exogenous Variables
The raw data for all exogenous data forecasts is listed in Table 4.1.
Gross Domestic Product
As was concluded in Chapter 2, the United States Gross Domestic Product
was shown to be a major influence on hotel demand. For both the long term and
short term, the demand for lodging was closely synchronized with the economy.
* Greatest influence is defined as maximizing the R2 of the stochastic equation.
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Because of the strong relationship, real GDP was chosen to be the test
variable for forecasting. Two forecasting scenarios were created with equivalent
exogenous variable except for real GDP.
As a base case scenario (Scenario A), the gross domestic product was shown
to increase at 2.5% per annum. This represents a realistic, conservative growth
based on current real GDP and economic conditions.
Alternatively, Scenario B forecasts similar 2.5% growth until the third quarter
of 1997, but then introduces an economic recession and subsequent economic
recovery. The annual GDP growth returns to the conservative 2.5% per annum
for the year ending in the third quarter of 2002. This scenario was chosen for it
mimics historical trends. From the 26 year time series, it appears that the U.S.
economy cycles through a similar recession and recovery every seven to eight
years. The last cycle was in 1990, therefore, the next cycle should occur in
1997.
Chart 4.1
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FORECAST ($1990)
8.00
7.00
6.00
z 5.000
- 4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0 C 0000C3 0 00 a a 0 a aa aC% aa aa a a a a00
N, 0 C' It U') W, f- W, U 0 Novo W~' ~C r- U, U 0 - WN W~ t DCD- W, U 0 - MN V)
YEAR
GDP ------ GDP FORECAST (A) - -.-- GDP FORECAST (B)
Enplanements
From the raw data, historical enplanements (ENPLANE), defined as the
number of domestic airline passengers, was shown to be a cyclical industry. For
simplicity purposes, the growth was assumed to be linear at a conservative 1 %
per period 6. This is in line with recent historical growth. This forecast was used
for both Scenario A and B.
Chart 4.2
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65 For this thesis, a period is defined as a quarter of a year.
Interest Rates
10 Year Treasury Notes (TNOTES) were used to represent interest rates.
These were forecast for both Scenario A and B to remain at of 7.84%. This rate
was chosen for it is in line with current U.S. interest rates.
Chart 4.3
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Inflation Rates
Inflation rates (INF) were forecast at a constant 3% per annum for both
Scenario A and B. This rate was chosen for it is in line with current U.S. inflation.
Chart 4.4
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Real Interest Rates
Real Interest Rates were calculated endogenously by subtracting the nominal
inflation rate (INF) from the 10 year treasury note rate (TNOTES). With both the
interest and inflation rates held to be constant for the ten year forecast period,
the real interest rate is calculated to be a steady 4.837%.
Chart 4.5
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Table 4.1 - Exogenous Variables Forecasts
GDP% GDP% ENPLANE TNOTES INF REALRATE
DATE GDP(A) DIFF(A) GDP(B) DIFF(B) (A)&(B) (A)&(B) (A)&(B) (A)&(B)
1995 Q1 $ 6,190,129,413,028 3.922% $ 6,190,129,413,028 3.922% 103,787,883 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1995 Q2 $ 6,228,460,219,141 3.523% $ 6,228,460,219,141 3.523% 104,825,761 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1995 Q3 $ 6,267,028,379,047 3.137% $ 6,267,028,379,047 3.137% 105,874,019 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1995 Q4 $ 6,305,835,362,500 2.500% $ 6,305,835,362,500 2.500% 106,932,759 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1996 Q1 $ 6,344,882,648,354 2.500% $ 6,344,882,648,354 2.500% 108,002,087 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1996 Q2 $ 6,384,171,724,619 2.500% $ 6,384,171,724,619 2.500% 109,082,108 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1996 Q3 $ 6,423,704,088,523 2.500% $ 6,423,704,088,523 2.500% 110,172,929 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1996 Q4 $ 6,463,481,246,563 2.500% $ 6,463,481,246,563 2.500% 111,274,658 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1997 Q1 $ 6,503,504,714,562 2.500% $ 6,503,504,714,562 2.500% 112,387,405 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1997 Q2 $ 6,543,776,017,735 2.500% $ 6,543,776,017,735 2.500% 113,511,279 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1997 Q3 $ 6,584,296,690,736 2.500% $ 6,543,776,017,735 1.869% 114,646,391 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1997 Q4 $ 6,625,068,277,727 2.500% $ 6,543,776,017,735 1.242% 115,792,855 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1998 Q1 $ 6,666,092,332,426 2.500% $ 6,543,776,017,735 0.619% 116,950,784 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1998 Q2 $ 6,707,370,418,178 2.500% $ 6,543,776,017,735 0.000% 118,120,292 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1998 Q3 $ 6,748,904,108,005 2.500% $ 6,510,808,843,179 -0.504% 119,301,495 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1998 Q4 $ 6,790,694,984,670 2.500% $ 6,478,007,755,389 -1.005% 120,494,510 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1999 Q1 $ 6,832,744,640,737 2.500% $ 6,445,371,917,629 -1.504% 121,699,455 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1999 Q2 $ 6,875,054,678,633 2.500% $ 6,412,900,497,380 -2.000% 122,916,449 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1999 Q3 $ 6,917,626,710,705 2.500% $ 6,444,727,283,734 -1.015% 124,145,614 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
1999 Q4 $ 6,960,462,359,286 2.500% $ 6,476,712,024,252 -0.020% 125,387,070 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2000 Q1 $ 7,003,563,256,756 2.500% $ 6,508,855,502,847 0.985% 126,640,941 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2000 Q2 $ 7,046,931,045,599 2.500% $ 6,541,158,507,328 2.000% 127,907,350 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2000 Q3 $ 7,090,567,378,473 2.500% $ 6,621,433,137,967 2.742% 129,186,423 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2000 Q4 $ 7,134,473,918,269 2.500% $ 6,702,692,917,693 3.489% 130,478,288 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2001 Q1 $ 7,178,652,338,174 2.500% $ 6,784,949,936,484 4.242% 131,783,071 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2001 Q2 $ 7,223,104,321,738 2.500% $ 6,868,216,432,694 5.000% 133,100,901 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2001 Q3 $ 7,267,831,562,934 2.500% $ 6,910,746,120,663 4.369% 134,431,910 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2001 Q4 $ 7,312,835,766,225 2.500% $ 6,953,539,162,936 3.742% 135,776,229 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2002 Q1 $ 7,358,118,646,629 2.500% $ 6,996,597,190,268 3.119% 137,133,992 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2002 Q2 $ 7,403,681,929,782 2.500% $ 7,039,921,843,512 2.500% 138,505,332 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2002 Q3 $ 7,449,527,352,008 2.500% $ 7,083,514,773,680 2.500% 139,890,385 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2002 Q4 $ 7,495,656,660,381 2.500% $ 7,127,377,642,010 2.500% 141,289,289 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2003 Q1 $ 7,542,071,612,794 2.500% $ 7,171,512,120,025 2.500% 142,702,182 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2003 Q2 $ 7,588,773,978,026 2.500% $ 7,215,919,889,599 2.500% 144,129,204 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2003 Q3 $ 7,635,765,535,808 2.500% $ 7,260,602,643,022 2.500% 145,570,496 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2003 Q4 $ 7,683,048,076,891 2.500% $ 7,305,562,083,060 2.500% 147,026,200 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2004 Q1 $ 7,730,623,403,114 2.500% $ 7,350,799,923,025 2.500% 148,496,463 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2004 Q2 $ 7,778,493,327,477 2.500% $ 7,396,317,886,839 2.500% 149,981,427 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2004 Q3 $ 7,826,659,674,203 2.500% $ 7,442,117,709,097 2.500% 151,481,241 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
2004 Q4 $ 7,875,124,278,813 2.500% $ 7,488,201,135,136 2.500% 152,996,054 7.84% 3.00% 4.837%
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Endogenous Variables
Having forecast all exogenous variables in the above section, the endogenous
variables can now be calculated. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, scrappage
was calculated as negative in some years. To correct for this discrepancy,
scrappage was set to zero in years that it was calculated as negative. Without
this correction, the total stock of hotel rooms would be overestimated which in
turn would skew the other endogenous variables. The data for forecasted
endogenous demand variables is presented in Table 4.2 and for supply variables
in Table 4.3.
Room Absorption
In Chapter 2, Equation 2.5, the room absorption or change in the number of
rooms sold was calculated as a function of current average room rates, current
GDP, current enplanements and lagged room demand (number of rooms sold).
Using the Scenario A data, room absorption remains at a somewhat constant
level for the 10 year forecast period. After 1996, the change in the number of
rooms sold decreases from approximately 73, 000 to a low of 62,000 around
1999 and increasing again to 75,000 at the end of the forecast period. The
annual fluctuations after 1996 are predominately calculated at less than 0.03%.
Alternatively, Scenario B demonstrates the sensitivity of room demand to
GDP. The 1997 recession causes a severe decrease in room demand that
reaches its nadir in mid-1999. The subsequent economic recovery catapults the
room demand past Scenario A's within one and a half years but finally settles
back at Scenario A's level at the end of 2004. Quarterly fluctuations are
dramatic with changes exceeding 100% or more during the peak recession
period.
Referring to the historical observations, Scenario B's forecast appears to
perpetuate room absorption's cycle of a drop and subsequent two year recovery
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period. This is consistent with the 0.58 adjustment factor from the room demand
adjustment model.
The year 1991, which was the low point of the last absorption cycle, was the
last year new stock from the late 1980's building boom entered the lodging
market. A significant portion of this stock had been absorbed by 1993. With the
little new construction in recent years, room absorption has reached a cyclical
historical apex in 1995 which should spur development.
Chart 4.6
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Number of Rooms Sold (Demand)
In Chapter 2, Equation 2.1, the number of rooms sold was calculated as an
identity equation using current room absorption added to last years room
demand.
In Scenario A, room demand constantly grows at an average rate of 0.71 %
per quarter culminating in a room demand of 2,819,633 units in 2004 Q4.
For scenario B the room demand grows at an average of 0.59% culminating in
a room demand of 2,684,009 units in 2004 Q4. This is a 4.8% difference from
Scenario A. Where Scenario A's growth is always positive, Scenario B
experiences some negative growth quarters in 1998 and 1999. After 1999 the
demand growth accelerates reaching a high of 1.32% in the 2000 Q3.
Chart 4.7
ROOMS SOLD FORECAST (TOTAL DEMAND)
2,900,000
2,600,000
2,300,0000
W 2,000,000
U-
0i 1,700,000
Ul
S1,400,000
1,100,000
800,000 | | | | | | | I | |
M Vc 0000 000000 0 000 00 00 00 M0 N0M
(0. NC)F U DN 0( - NC)l 0- 0(00- C')W mo (0(0 0 (00 (N0'
YEAR
ROOMS SOLD .... FORECASTED ROOMS SOLD (A) - - - - FORECASTED ROOMS SOLD (B)
Occupancy Rate
In Chapter 2, Equation 2.6, the identity equation for the occupancy rate was
calculated as a ratio of current room demand divided by the total room stock.
In Scenario A the occupancy rate grows at an average of 0.23% but does
experience some minor negative changes (less than 0.2%) in a few quarters.
The occupancy rate achieves 75.5% at the end of the forecast period.
Scenario B experiences an average growth rate of 0.18% per quarter but
oscillates between positive and negative more often. The occupancy rate in
Scenario B dips as low as 69.21% in the year 2000 but recovers by mid-2001
and rises to 73.48% at the end of the forecast. This is approximately 2% less
than Scenario A's occupancy rate.
Regardless of the scenario used, both culminate in a historically high
occupancy rate spurred on by room demand increase.
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Real Average Room Rate
In Chapter 2, Equation 2.10, the change in the real average room rate was
calculated as a function of the lagged variables: occupancy rate, inflation rate,
and real average room rate. The real average room rate was calculated using
the methodology of Equation 2.1 whereby the real average rate this period is
equal to the change in the real average rate added to the real average rate in
last years corresponding period.
In both Scenario A and B the real average room rate reaches a historic high of
$70.17 and $67.62 respectively (a 3.8% difference). In both scenarios, the real
average room rate recovers past its 1988 maximum in 1998.
With inflation being held constant in both simulations all changes are
attributable to the occupancy rate changes.
In Chapter 2 it was shown that the real average room rate adjusts very slowly
at 8.3% per year. This slow adjustment rate minimizes the negative impact of
the recession on occupancy in Scenario B. This slow adjustment leads to a
steady rate increase over the 10 year period.
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This constant room rate increase slowly returns real average room rates to the
average trend line of the twenty-six year data series. Near the end of the
forecast period, the real average room rate may barely surpass it.
Chart 4.9
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Room Completions (Construction)
In Chapter 3, Equation 3.5, the change in the number of rooms completed
(construction) was calculated as a function of last year's values for total room
stock, interest rates, room rate inflation, room absorption and room completions
and the real average room rate from two years ago. The number of completions
this period was then calculated using the methodology of Equation 2.1 whereby
the current room completions equals the change in the number of room
completions added to the room completions in last years corresponding period.
As was determined in Chapter 3, the construction level adjusts itself very
quickly to market changes. Construction will head toward its target level at 64%
per year.
In Scenario A, the number of completed rooms grows at an average of 3.75%
per quarter during the entire forecast period versus only 3.57% in Scenario B.
The recession in Scenario B puts a damper on a recovering lodging
development market until mid-2000. After 2000, the recovery steadily
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accelerates completions from approximately 10,0000 rooms per quarter to over
19,500 rooms per quarter by the end of the forecast period.
By combining the time series data and forecast data it can be seen that 1994
to 1996 is a historical development low for the lodging industry. Therefore, from
this forecast it can be argued that regardless of which scenario is used, lodging
development is on the cusp of a building surge driven by the steady increase in
room rates. As was calculated in Chapter 2, the price elasticity of construction is
7.3 which is a very elastic relationship.
It should be pointed out that this increase in construction will not equal the
building booms of the mid-1 980's or early 1970's. As was explained in the real
average room rate section above, the room rate is returning to the time series
trend line from a low period in the early 1990's. For there to be a boom, the real
average room rate would have to considerably exceed the real average room
rate data series trend line. Therefore, while there will be increased development
for the next ten years, it will be moderate and perhaps at half the rate
experienced in the mid-1980's.
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Scrappage (Demolition)
In Chapter 3, Equation 3.7, the number of rooms scrapped this period was
calculated as a function of the current change in real GDP, last year's real
average room rate, the current number of room completions and last year's real
interest rate.
In both scenarios, scrappage effectively goes to zero. As is being shown
above, the lodging industry is about to enter a growth mode. Occupancy and
real average room rates are headed towards historical highs which improves the
cash flows of all properties.
Again, the real average room rate has the greatest influence over scrappage
and with it trending upwards for the next decade, economic obsolescence
diminishes. This forecast demonstrates the Chapter 3 price elasticity of
scrappage calculation of -3.92.
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Room Stock (Total Supply)
In Chapter 3, Equation 3.1, the identity equation for the total room stock was
calculated as last years total room stock plus current room completions minus
current room scrappage.
Regardless of the scenario chosen the room stock is increasing to historic
highs due to the anticipated high construction levels. For Scenario A the room
stock increases an average of 0.41% per period to 3,731,447 units in 2004. For
Scenario B the room stock increases an average of 0.36% per period to
3,652,793 units in 2004. This is a difference of only 0.05%.
With the moderate increase in construction forecasted above, the total room
stock will only increase a little more than 1.1 %. Keeping all else equal, if real
average room rates keep adjusting at the same steady rate, the ultimate total
room stock increase would reach only be 1.78%.
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Table 4.2 - Endogenous Demand Variable Forecast Data
AB AB SOLD SOLD OC OC R R
DATE (A) (B) (A) 1(B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
1995 Q1
1995 Q2
1995 Q3
1995 Q4
1996 Q1
1996 Q2
1996 Q3
1996 Q4
1997 Q1
1997 Q2
1997 Q3
1997 Q4
1998 Q1
1998 Q2
1998 Q3
1998 Q4
1999 Q1
1999 Q2
1999 Q3
1999 Q4
2000 Q1
2000 Q2
2000 Q3
2000 Q4
2001 Q1
2001 Q2
2001 Q3
2001 Q4
2002 Q1
2002 Q2
2002 Q3
2002 Q4
2003 Q1
2003 Q2
2003 Q3
2003 Q4
2004 Q1
2004 Q2
2004 Q3
2004 Q4
94,417
103,317
112,580
92,598
74,856
78,312
81,006
72,692
66,597
67,770
67,822
64,655
63,518
63,785
62,891
61,997
62,897
62,881
61,799
61,931
63,615
63,598
62,653
63,275
65,214
65,313
64,628
65,501
67,475
67,725
67,321
68,329
70,249
70,642
70,494
71,573
73,401
73,911
73,975
75,083
94,417
103,317
112,580
92,598
74,856
78,312
81,006
72,692
66,597
67,770
57,359
43,665
31,936
21,545
7,977
(5,576)
(17,320)
(29,967)
(18,977)
(6,785)
6,943
18,956
35,424
53,645
73,370
91,448
87,382
84,767
83,142
79,681
77,567
76,843
77,007
75,614
74,578
74,762
75,684
75,271
74,815
75,398
2,150,017
2,164,817
2,189,380
2,214,598
2,224,873
2,243,129
2,270,387
2,287,290
2,291,469
2,310,899
2,338,208
2,351,945
2,354,987
2,374,683
2,401,100
2,413,941
2,417,884
2,437,565
2,462,898
2,475,872
2,481,499
2,501,163
2,525,552
2,539,147
2,546,713
2,566,476
2,590,179
2,604,648
2,614,188
2,634,201
2,657,500
2,672,977
2,684,437
2,704,843
2,727,995
2,744,550
2,757,838
2,778,754
2,801,969
2,819,633
2,150,017
2,164,817
2,189,380
2,214,598
2,224,873
2,243,129
2,270,387
2,287,290
2,291,469
2,310,899
2,327,746
2,330,955
2,323,405
2,332,443
2,335,723
2,325,379
2,306,085
2,302,476
2,316,747
2,318,595
2,313,027
2,321,432
2,352,170
2,372,240
2,386,397
2,412,881
2,439,553
2,457,006
2,469,540
2,492,561
2,517,120
2,533,849
2,546,547
2,568,175
2,591,698
2,608,611
2,622,231
2,643,447
2,666,513
2,684,009
67.79%
68.09%
68.75%
69.39%
69.50%
69.89%
70.60%
70.98%
70.90%
71.30%
72.00%
72.26%
72.11%
72.49%
73.11%
73.29%
73.13%
73.44%
73.97%
74.09%
73.92%
74.17%
74.59%
74.67%
74.49%
74.68%
75.02%
75.05%
74.89%
75.03%
75.29%
75.30%
75.15%
75.25%
75.45%
75.45%
75.32%
75.40%
75.57%
75.56%
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67.79%
68.09%
68.75%
69.39%
69.50%
69.89%
70.60%
70.98%
70.90%
71.30%
71.68%
71.62%
71.15%
71.20%
71.13%
70.64%
69.80%
69.47%
69.73%
69.61%
69.21%
69.25%
69.99%
70.37%
70.51%
71.01%
71.53%
71.74%
71.73%
72.02%
72.38%
72.48%
72.43%
72.64%
72.92%
73.01%
72.97%
73.14%
73.39%
73.48%
$57.42
$57.24
$56.32
$56.89
$58.47
$58.36
$57.62
$58.24
$59.71
$59.66
$59.10
$59.73
$61.06
$61.08
$60.67
$61.29
$62.49
$62.56
$62.29
$62.88
$63.95
$64.07
$63.90
$64.46
$65.42
$65.57
$65.48
$66.00
$66.85
$67.02
$66.99
$67.48
$68.23
$68.41
$68.42
$68.87
$69.54
$69.71
$69.75
$70.17
$57.42
$57.24
$56.32
$56.89
$58.47
$58.36
$57.62
$58.24
$59.71
$59.66
$59.10
$59.73
$61.06
$61.08
$60.62
$61.19
$62.34
$62.36
$61.93
$62.37
$63.30
$63.27
$62.92
$63.30
$64.09
$64.07
$63.86
$64.27
$65.01
$65.08
$64.96
$65.38
$66.05
$66.16
$66.11
$66.50
$67.12
$67.24
$67.24
$67.62
Table 4.2 - Endogenous Supply Variable Forecast Data
C C S S SCRAP SCRAP
DATE (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
1995 Q1
1995 Q2
1995 Q3
1995 Q4
1996 Q1
1996 Q2
1996 Q3
1996 Q4
1997 Q1
1997 Q2
1997 Q3
1997 Q4
1998 Q1
1998 Q2
1998 Q3
1998 Q4
1999 Q1
1999 Q2
1999 Q3
1999 Q4
2000 Q1
2000 Q2
2000 Q3
2000 Q4
2001 Q1
2001 Q2
2001 Q3
2001 Q4
2002 Q1
2002 Q2
2002 Q3
2002 Q4
2003 Q1
2003 Q2
2003 Q3
2003 Q4
2004 Q1
2004 Q2
2004 Q3
2004 Q4
9,599
7,474
5,402
7,146
9,407
8,489
6,167
6,661
9,611
8,955
6,497
7,350
10,906
10,363
8,079
9,311
13,013
12,567
10,582
11,987
15,510
15,148
13,472
14,878
18,054
17,748
16,341
17,640
20,403
20,124
18,927
20,064
22,404
22,124
21,081
22,032
23,971
23,669
22,735
23,497
9,599
7,474
5,402
7,146
9,407
8,489
6,167
6,661
9,611
8,955
6,497
7,350
10,906
10,363
7,611
8,372
11,600
10,676
7,904
8,535
11,299
10,187
8,605
10,138
13,476
13,349
12,528
14,448
17,862
18,240
16,905
17,911
20,120
19,691
18,385
19,082
20,776
20,230
19,102
19,679
85
3,171,656
3,179,131
3,184,532
3,191,678
3,201,085
3,209,574
3,215,741
3,222,402
3,232,013
3,240,969
3,247,465
3,254,815
3,265,721
3,276,084
3,284,164
3,293,475
3,306,489
3,319,056
3,329,638
3,341,626
3,357,136
3,372,283
3,385,756
3,400,634
3,418,687
3,436,436
3,452,777
3,470,417
3,490,820
3,510,944
3,529,871
3,549,934
3,572,338
3,594,462
3,615,543
3,637,575
3,661,546
3,685,215
3,707,950
3,731,447
3,171,656
3,179,131
3,184,532
3,191,678
3,201,085
3,209,574
3,215,741
3,222,402
3,232,013
3,240,969
3,247,465
3,254,815
3,265,721
3,276,084
3,283,695
3,292,067
3,303,667
3,314,343
3,322,247
3,330,781
3,342,080
3,352,267
3,360,872
3,371,010
3,384,486
3,397,834
3,410,362
3,424,811
3,442,672
3,460,913
3,477,818
3,495,729
3,515,848
3,535,539
3,553,924
3,573,006
3,593,782
3,614,013
3,633,114
3,652,793
-- L.-
Summary
With the steady economic growth predicted in Scenario A, all endogenous
variables experience steady growth throughout the next decade. With
absorption at a six year high, the room demand has been increasing. The
increased room demand increases occupancy rates. The increased occupancy
rates raise the real average room rate. The very elastic relationship between
real average room rates and construction spurs construction. The elastic
relationship between real average room rates and scrappage also decreases
scrappage to zero. These effects combined slowly raise the room stock. The
slow adjustment rate of the real average room rate maintains this construction
increase for the next decade.
Scenario B's forecast is similar to Scenario A's. With the two year recession,
room demand does drop but quickly recovers within a year and a half of the
recession. This does cause a downward trend in occupancy for about three
years. The slow adjustment rate on the real average room rate equation means
that the room rate decreases only slightly. This decrease slows construction.
With the recovery, Scenario B's demand increases which increases
occupancy rates. This increased occupancy rate (though small) spurs
construction due to the elastic relationship between room rate and construction.
The slow adjustment from the room rate occupancy relationship means that
construction continues. The new construction raises the room stock which will
ultimately lower occupancy rates, but this is not apparent in the forecast horizon.
Considering either scenario, it appears that now is a good time to invest into
the lodging industry. Room rates are forecasted to climb to historic highs as is
occupancy. As a developer, completions are now at a cyclical low while
absorption is at a cyclical high. These findings suggest that now is the
opportune time to begin development on new properties. This development
cycle is just now beginning and will increase over the next ten years.
Overall, construction increases will be much more conservative than the last
building boom in the 1980's causing the total room stock to increase only 1.1 %
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion
This chapter will discuss what has been learned about the United States
lodging market. The findings and conclusions from the analyses in the previous
chapters will be summarized below.
First, hotel room absorption was shown to be strongly, positively correlated
with real GDP in both the long term and the short term. U.S. domestic
enplanements were also shown to be positively correlated to room absorption
but to a much lesser extent. The adjustment model was completed with real
average room rates which were shown to be negatively correlated with room
absorption. Collectively, the variables demonstrate that 58% of the total number
of travelers will adjust their room consumption each year.
With regard to the real average room rate alone, it was calculated that a 1 %
increase in the real average room rate, will decrease the room absorption by
0.47%.
Next, the real average room rate was shown to be positively correlated and
vary primarily with the occupancy rate. It was calculated that a 1 % increase in
the occupancy would increase the average rate by 2.3%. Alternatively, inflation
was shown to a lesser extent to negatively influence the real average room rate.
When combined, the adjustment factor was calculated at only 0.083. This
means that for any changes in these variables, the hotel operators will only
adjust their real average room rate by 8.3% per year. This is a very slow
adjustment factor that relates back to the absorption model price inelasticity of
demand.
The number of room completions was then also calculated as an adjustment
model. It was shown to be positively influenced by increases in the real average
room rate, room rate inflation and room absorption. Alternatively, it was also
demonstrated to be negatively correlated with increases in interest rates and the
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existing room stock. Altogether, the model had an adjustment factor of 0.6488.
This means that in each year, almost 65% of the developers adjust their
construction level towards the target level. This change is very dependent on
real average room rates for it was calculated that a 1 % increase in the real
average rate will increase room completions by 7.3%.
This quick construction level also alters the total room stock which then acts
as a damper on construction. For each 1 % increase in room stock, the real
average room rate decreases 1.78%.
Finally, the room scrappage was determined. It was shown that room
scrappage decreases with increases in real GDP, real average room rates and
real interest rates. These variables all increase the financial viability of a
property decreasing the scrappage option value. Alternatively, scrappage was
shown to increase with increases in room completions. With regard to the real
average room rate, room scrappage was shown to decrease 3.92% for every 1 %
increase in real average room rates.
For scrappage, the real GDP inflation rate, real average room rates and real
interest rates were shown to be negatively correlated while room completions
was demonstrated as positive. The price elasticity of scrappage was calculated
at -3.92 which indicates that scrappage is very sensitive to room rate changes.
The models were then tested on two forecasting scenarios. Scenario (A)
forecasted steady 2.5% annual GDP growth, quarterly enplanement growth of
1% and constant interest rates and inflation rates at 7.84% and 3% respectively.
Scenario (B) maintained similar forecasts for enplanements, inflation and interest
rates but introduced an economic recession and subsequent recovery in 1995.
With the steady economic growth predicted in Scenario A, all endogenous
variables experience steady growth throughout the next decade. With
absorption at a six year high, the room demand has been increasing. The
increased room demand increases occupancy rates. The increased occupancy
rates raise the real average room rate. The very elastic relationship between
real average room rates and construction spurs construction. The elastic
relationship between real average room rates and scrappage also decreases
scrappage to zero. These effects combined slowly raise the room stock. The
slow adjustment rate of the real average room rate maintains this construction
increase for the next decade.
Scenario B's forecast is similar to Scenario A's. With the two year recession,
room demand does drop but quickly recovers within a year and a half of the
recession. This does cause a downward trend in occupancy for about three
years. The slow adjustment rate on the real average room rate equation means
that the room rate decreases only slightly. This decrease slows construction.
With the recovery, Scenario B's demand increases which increases
occupancy rates. This increased occupancy rate (though small) spurs
construction due to the elastic relationship between room rate and construction.
The slow adjustment from the room rate occupancy relationship means that
construction continues. The new construction raises the room stock which will
ultimately lower occupancy rates, but this is not apparent in the forecast horizon.
Considering either scenario, it appears that now is a good time to invest into
the lodging industry. Room rates are forecasted to climb to historic highs as is
occupancy. As a developer, completions are now at a cyclical low while
absorption is at a cyclical high. These findings suggest that now is the
opportune time to begin development on new properties. This development
cycle is just now beginning and will increase over the next ten years.
Overall, construction increases will be much more conservative than the last
building boom in the 1980's causing the total room stock to increase only 1.1 %
APPENDICES
Table Al - Observation Data Set for Exogenous Variables
DATE GDP ($1990) ENPLANE TNOTES INF REALRATE
1969 Q1 $ 3,246,410,200,000 38,277,281 6.12% 5.62% 0.499%
1969 Q2 $ 3,252,184,300,000 39,221,513 6.35% 5.54% 0.813%
1969 Q3 $ 3,269,619,900,000 39,694,075 6.86% 5.46% 1.393%
1969 Q4 $ 3,261,355,000,000 39,260,517 7.30% 6.47% 0.828%
1970 Q1 $ 3,251,844,700,000 39,455,825 7.37% 6.37% 1.001%
1970 Q2 $ 3,237,352,800,000 38,439,254 7.71% 5.22% 2.491%
1970 Q3 $ 3,279,356,600,000 38,461,668 7.46% 4.12% 3.336%
1970 Q4 $ 3,255,354,400,000 37,753,664 6.85% 6.12% 0.731%
1971 Q1 $ 3,336,644,900,000 37,785,785 6.02% 2.01% 4.007%
1971 Q2 $ 3,344,230,500,000 38,546,879 6.25% 5.00% 1.247%
1971 Q3 $ 3,365,741,900,000 38,729,498 6.48% 2.96% 3.520%
1971 Q4 $ 3,381,365,900,000 39,768,070 5.89% 2.94% 2.949%
1972 Q1 $ 3,441,937,500,000 41,556,036 5.80% 2.92% 2.880%
1972 Q2 $ 3,498,433,300,000 41,995,690 6.14% 2.90% 3.245%
1972 Q3 $ 3,537,606,700,000 42,326,062 6.29% 3.84% 2.453%
1972 Q4 $ 3,593,083,400,000 43,340,788 6.37% 3.80% 2.573%
1973 Q1 $ 3,682,072,700,000 44,161,017 6.60% 8.47% -1.867%
1973 Q2 $ 3,699,395,000,000 44,852,314 6.81% 7.37% -0.567%
1973 Q3 $ 3,696,451,400,000 45,050,246 7.21% 9.05% -1.843%
1973 Q4 $ 3,724,529,400,000 45,329,331 6.75% 9.73% -2.981%
1974 Q1 $ 3,690,224,400,000 46,721,720 7.05% 6.74% 0.315%
1974 Q2 $ 3,699,508,300,000 47,447,803 7.54% 16.31% -8.769%
1974 Q3 $ 3,667,241,200,000 46,573,106 7.96% 13.06% -5.098%
1974 Q4 $ 3,652,862,500,000 45,437,575 7.67% 10.28% -2.607%
1975 Q1 $ 3,570,892,700,000 45,024,407 7.54% 6.94% 0.604%
1975 Q2 $ 3,612,104,000,000 45,099,868 8.05% 5.30% 2.747%
1975 Q3 $ 3,679,468,700,000 46,483,468 8.30% 8.22% 0.072%
1975 Q4 $ 3,727,699,500,000 48,563,444 8.06% 7.33% 0.737%
1976 Q1 $ 3,800,385,400,000 49,224,378 7.75% 2.88% 4.876%
1976 Q2 $ 3,814,537,600,000 49,839,647 7.77% 5.00% 2.773%
1976 Q3 $ 3,827,897,400,000 50,237,968 7.73% 6.35% 1.381%
1976 Q4 $ 3,867,863,300,000 50,467,427 7.19% 5.56% 1.634%
1977 Q1 $ 3,924,585,500,000 51,721,475 7.35% 8.22% -0.866%
1977 Q2 $ 3,990,931,100,000 52,240,217 7.37% 6.04% 1.330%
1977 Q3 $ 4,046,860,800,000 53,567,004 7.36% 5.29% 2.067%
1977 Q4 $ 4,038,709,100,000 55,143,265 7.60% 6.53% 1.071%
1978 Q1 $ 4,066,560,700,000 57,594,057 8.01% 7.06% 0.947%
1978 Q2 $ 4,196,987,700,000 59,276,731 8.32% 10.09% -1.775%
1978 Q3 $ 4,229,368,100,000 61,409,740 8.49% 9.23% -0.741%
1978 Q4 $ 4,279,183,900,000 62,139,749 8.82% 8.42% 0.399%
1979 Q1 $ 4,280,542,500,000 66,290,739 9.11% 11.78% -2.675%
1979 Q2 $ 4,284,505,200,000 64,167,862 9.11% 13.16% -4.048%
1979 Q3 $ 4,310,771,700,000 68,426,682 9.10% 12.19% -3.085%
1979 Q4 $ 4,318,810,200,000 68,040,241 10.45% 13.44% -2.994%
DATE GDP ($1990) ENPLANE TNOTES INF REALRATE
1980 Q1 $ 4,337,151,500,000 67,047,044 11.99% 16.64% -4.658%
1980 Q2 $ 4,225,971,500,000 66,731,312 10.48% 11.99% -1.508%
1980 Q3 $ 4,226,990,500,000 63,703,064 10.95% 6.79% 4.165%
1980 Q4 $ 4,311,903,900,000 63,150,955 12.42% 11.92% 0.504%
1981 Q1 $ 4,370,777,200,000 61,947,935 12.96% 10.19% 2.775%
1981 Q2 $ 4,352,549,100,000 64,412,328 13.75% 8.58% 5.172%
1981 Q3 $ 4,375,305,900,000 62,243,631 14.85% 11.49% 3.355%
1981 Q4 $ 4,305,790,100,000 63,292,123 14.09% 4.30% 9.790%
1982 Q1 $ 4,252,577,700,000 61,601,977 14.29% 2.55% 11.743%
1982 Q2 $ 4,269,560,400,000 64,551,936 13.93% 9.71% 4.215%
1982 Q3 $ 4,250,653,000,000 64,165,557 13.12% 2.89% 10.230%
1982 Q4 $ 4,256,540,300,000 64,902,790 10.67% 0.00% 10.667%
1983 Q1 $ 4,283,599,400,000 69,048,844 10.56% 1.64% 8.926%
1983 Q2 $ 4,400,213,900,000 69,181,265 10.54% 5.30% 5.243%
1983 Q3 $ 4,465,767,000,000 68,555,204 11.63% 4.02% 7.603%
1983 Q4 $ 4,542,415,600,000 69,257,880 11.69% 3.98% 7.703%
1984 Q1 $ 4,630,046,200,000 69,749,519 11.94% 5.92% 6.026%
1984 Q2 $ 4,691,750,000,000 72,145,916 13.20% 3.11% 10.090%
1984 Q3 $ 4,717,110,800,000 74,457,693 12.87% 3.86% 9.009%
1984 Q4 $ 4,748,585,400,000 79,196,690 11.74% 3.06% 8.687%
1985 Q1 $ 4,779,833,500,000 79,908,389 11.58% 4.93% 6.654%
1985 Q2 $ 4,817,195,400,000 82,751,769 10.81% 2.62% 8.192%
1985 Q3 $ 4,878,559,500,000 83,051,958 10.34% 2.23% 8.104%
1985 Q4 $ 4,906,297,900,000 83,789,684 9.76% 5.18% 4.580%
1986 Q1 $ 4,970,832,100,000 85,278,462 8.56% -1.46% 10.018%
1986 Q2 $ 4,967,662,000,000 87,905,122 7.60% 1.10% 6.503%
1986 Q3 $ 4,995,853,300,000 91,811,015 7.31% 2.19% 5.113%
1986 Q4 $ 5,012,269,900,000 91,263,326 7.26% 2.91% 4.354%
1987 Q1 $ 5,049,518,600,000 93,461,081 7.19% 5.42% 1.778%
1987 Q2 $ 5,112,128,100,000 95,677,264 8.34% 4.63% 3.713%
1987 Q3 $ 5,161,943,900,000 95,934,691 8.88% 4.23% 4.651%
1987 Q4 $ 5,236,894,200,000 93,983,532 9.12% 3.14% 5.987%
1988 Q1 $ 5,270,633,100,000 94,489,487 8.42% 3.11% 5.305%
1988 Q2 $ 5,326,676,000,000 93,733,294 8.91% 5.15% 3.764%
1988 Q3 $ 5,360,301,700,000 95,373,838 9.10% 5.08% 4.020%
1988 Q4 $ 5,411,476,200,000 96,765,560 8.96% 4.01% 4.943%
1989 Q1 $ 5,454,385,800,000 94,156,986 9.21% 4.97% 4.240%
1989 Q2 $ 5,478,614,400,000 92,904,144 8.77% 5.89% 2.886%
1989 Q3 $ 5,478,614,400,000 94,840,462 8.11% 2.58% 5.528%
1989 Q4 $ 5,498,654,000,000 96,588,322 7.91% 4.80% 3.103%
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1990 Q1 $ 5,537,261,300,000 96,769,500 8.42% 7.28% 1.145%
1990 Q2 $ 5,550,734,200,000 95,789,888 8.68% 4.04% 4.636%
1990 Q3 $ 5,527,977,400,000 96,297,476 8.70% 8.00% 0.703%
1990 Q4 $ 5,472,727,100,000 96,380,535 8.40% 5.13% 3.268%
1991 Q1 $ 5,430,723,200,000 93,270,629 8.02% 2.08% 5.932%
1991 Q2 $ 5,453,819,700,000 93,282,437 8.13% 2.96% 5.167%
1991 Q3 $ 5,470,462,700,000 95,882,123 7.94% 3.24% 4.705%
1991 Q4 $ 5,478,048,300,000 97,669,687 7.35% 3.50% 3.846%
1992 Q1 $ 5,517,901,000,000 96,971,529 7.30% 2.60% 4.700%
1992 Q2 $ 5,539,072,800,000 96,012,283 7.38% 3.16% 4.216%
1992 Q3 $ 5,585,831,800,000 105,952,981 6.62% 2.57% 4.051%
1992 Q4 $ 5,738,223,100,000 100,083,109 6.74% 3.40% 3.344%
1993 Q1 $ 5,749,431,600,000 98,262,090 6.28% 3.09% 3.190%
1993 Q2 $ 5,780,226,900,000 99,145,322 5.99% 2.51% 3.481%
1993 Q3 $ 5,818,721,000,000 98,015,831 5.62% 1.94% 3.678%
1993 Q4 $ 5,907,710,300,000 103,747,464 5.61% 3.31% 2.299%
1994 Q1 $ 5,956,507,200,000 104,615,097 6.07% 2.46% 3.606%
1994 Q2 $ 6,016,512,700,000 106,379,575 7.08% 2.45% 4.638%
1994 Q3 $ 6,076,404,900,000 104,338,757 7.33% 3.51% 3.822%
1994 Q4 $ 6,152,034,500,000 102,760,280 7.84% 2.14% 5.695%
Table A2 - Observation Data Set for Endogenous Variables
DATE SOLD IOC R C I S [SCRAP
1969 Q1
1969 Q2
1969 Q3
1969 Q4
1970 Q1
1970 Q2
1970 Q3
1970 Q4
1971 Q1
1971 Q2
1971 Q3
1971 Q4
1972 Q1
1972 Q2
1972 Q3
1972 Q4
1973 Q1
1973 Q2
1973 Q3
1973 Q4
1974 Q1
1974 Q2
1974 Q3
1974 Q4
1975 Q1
1975 Q2
1975 Q3
1975 Q4
1976 Q1
1976 Q2
1976 Q3
1976 Q4
1977 Q1
1977 Q2
1977 Q3
1977 Q4
1978 Q1
1978 Q2
1978 Q3
1978 Q4
1979 Q1
1979 Q2
1979 Q3
1979 Q4
982,500
956,600
937,400
944,400
912,800
906,300
881,500
876,800
870,200
875,000
894,000
916,500
1,007,500
1,065,800
1,070,900
1,080,500
1,099,400
1,129,800
1,144,200
1,158,900
1,176,700
1,198,900
1,211,300
1,197,300
1,165,100
1,164,200
1,203,300
1,197,500
1,219,900
1,253,800
1,314,200
1,269,200
1,319,600
1,332,900
1,362,400
1,385,800
1,393,400
1,416,200
1,404,400
1,415,000
1,441,700
1,449,900
1,447,800
1,461,300
59.70%
59.70%
58.15%
58.24%
56.08%
55.36%
53.70%
53.15%
52.58%
52.74%
53.66%
54.69%
59.89%
63.05%
62.90%
63.04%
63.37%
64.27%
64.30%
64.34%
64.67%
65.29%
65.47%
64.11%
61.98%
61.56%
63.28%
62.59%
63.33%
64.75%
67.52%
64.90%
67.03%
67.35%
68.47%
69.37%
69.57%
70.52%
69.86%
70.19%
71.36%
71.50%
71.17%
71.45%
$41.91
$42.41
$42.47
$42.57
$44.18
$44.60
$45.04
$44.98
$44.64
$44.83
$45.06
$45.32
$45.08
$45.38
$46.07
$46.11
$45.31
$44.88
$44.81
$44.29
$43.89
$43.43
$42.87
$43.25
$43.74
$43.37
$42.81
$43.01
$43.23
$43.55
$44.01
$43.62
$43.77
$43.69
$44.19
$44.58
$45.43
$46.24
$47.04
$47.72
$48.91
$49.21
$49.82
$50.16
16,068
16,354
17,308
18,348
20,209
21,876
22,097
22,033
21,314
20,409
19,341
18,629
19,092
20,769
23,880
26,573
29,852
32,684
34,558
36,745
38,252
39,108
37,662
32,554
26,762
21,856
17,246
13,329
10,938
8,946
8,504
8,839
9,140
9,575
9,838
10,111
10,975
12,437
13,142
13,118
13,622
14,533
15,746
16,982
1,594,900
1,603,374
1,612,685
1,621,264
1,628,951
1,636,370
1,643,164
1,649,467
1,654,644
1,660,609
1,666,708
1,674,570
1,683,048
1,691,827
1,703,208
1,714,118
1,735,716
1,758,695
1,780,203
1,801,378
1,819,775
1,836,690
1,851,680
1,866,027
1,879,017
1,891,341
1,902,844
1,914,482
1,924,841
1,935,280
1,946,001
1,957,217
1,967,987
1,978,794
1,989,179
1,999,487
2,002,825
2,007,138
2,011,270
2,015,596
2,020,625
2,027,063
2,034,771
2,044,399
7,400
7,880
7,996
9,769
12,522
14,456
15,303
15,730
16,137
14,443
13,242
10,766
10,615
11,989
12,499
15,663
8,254
9,706
13,050
15,570
19,855
22,193
22,672
18,207
13,772
9,532
5,742
1,690
579
(1,493)
(2,217)
(2,377)
(1,629)
(1,233)
(547)
(197)
7,638
8,123
9,009
8,792
8,593
8,095
8,038
7,354
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1980 Q1 1,437,600 70.06% $50.91 19,110 2,052,890 10,618
1980 Q2 1,403,600 68.11% $51.04 21,235 2,061,812 12,314
1980 Q3 1,408,900 68.08% $51.55 21,630 2,070,806 12,636
1980 Q4 1,400,700 67.26% $51.68 21,602 2,080,321 12,086
1981 Q1 1,405,500 67.31% $52.65 21,003 2,089,701 11,623
1981 Q2 1,412,900 67.30% $51.94 20,016 2,099,723 9,993
1981 Q3 1,404,800 66.51% $51.53 20,190 2,111,681 8,232
1981 Q4 1,374,000 64.68% $52.71 20,659 2,123,210 9,129
1982 Q1 1,414,700 66.34% $52.66 21,513 2,133,348 11,375
1982 Q2 1,378,900 64.28% $52.96 21,741 2,144,207 10,881
1982 Q3 1,374,100 63.75% $52.80 21,781 2,156,142 9,846
1982 Q4 1,388,800 63.96% $53.59 21,421 2,168,530 9,033
1983 Q1 1,439,800 65.76% $53.52 22,057 2,191,101 (514)
1983 Q2 1,434,300 64.75% $54.36 22,563 2,213,012 652
1983 Q3 1,431,800 64.08% $55.39 23,258 2,236,181 89
1983 Q4 1,468,300 64.88% $55.29 24,874 2,262,855 (1,801)
1984 Q1 1,503,200 65.64% $55.36 26,325 2,289,961 (781)
1984 Q2 1,507,500 65.04% $55.97 27,433 2,317,944 (550)
1984 Q3 1,520,100 64.84% $56.67 28,836 2,345,902 878
1984 Q4 1,539,500 64.83% $57.41 30,675 2,373,265 3,312
1985 Q1 1,555,600 64.80% $56.99 32,836 2,401,093 5,007
1985 Q2 1,559,100 64.14% $57.53 34,294 2,429,923 5,464
1985 Q3 1,534,500 62.44% $57.98 35,670 2,459,005 6,588
1985 Q4 1,545,500 62.14% $57.61 36,758 2,489,441 6,322
1986 Q1 1,541,600 61.16% $58.37 38,366 2,517,301 10,505
1986 Q2 1,576,400 61.87% $58.79 39,156 2,546,296 10,162
1986 Q3 1,623,500 63.11% $59.14 38,901 2,576,325 8,871
1986 Q4 1,582,200 60.76% $58.77 38,110 2,605,877 8,559
1987 Q1 1,633,000 61.79% $61.04 38,919 2,646,402 (1,605)
1987 Q2 1,651,000 61.88% $60.68 38,771 2,678,810 6,363
1987 Q3 1,690,700 62.70% $60.56 37,050 2,708,823 7,036
1987 Q4 1,678,400 61.62% $60.72 34,197 2,734,765 8,254
1988 Q1 1,681,300 61.63% $60.90 32,354 2,758,833 8,287
1988 Q2 1,731,200 62.21% $60.63 31,011 2,793,333 (3,489)
1988 Q3 1,760,200 62.70% $60.35 30,684 2,821,875 2,142
1988 Q4 1,768,500 62.38% $59.80 30,061 2,843,684 8,253
1989 Q1 1,804,900 62.94% $60.30 29,822 2,867,974 5,532
1989 Q2 1,828,000 63.34% $59.73 28,564 2,893,011 3,527
1989 Q3 1,834,000 63.11% $59.62 26,775 2,924,234 (4,447)
1989 Q4 1,863,800 63.44%, $58.50 25,327 2,950,897, (1,335)
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1990 Q1 1,889,000 63.48% $59.61 25,163 2,971,728 4,332
1990 Q2 1,880,300 62.92% $58.94 25,692 2,987,708 9,711
1990 Q3 1,865,900 61.93% $57.56 26,581 3,024,701 (10,411)
1990 Q4 1,857,400 61.15% $56.46 25,609 3,046,659 3,652
1991 Q1 1,818,100 59.36% $57.08 23,488 3,061,599 8,547
1991 Q2 1,886,100 61.36% $57.01 20,306 3,077,905 4,001
1991 Q3 1,880,500 61.07% $55.67 17,380 3,087,711 7,573
1991 Q4 1,887,200 60.99% $55.42 14,172 3,096,869 5,014
1992 Q1 1,871,000 60.84% $56.16 11,209 3,108,029 49
1992 Q2 1,918,000 61.55% $55.72 8,531 3,117,962 (1,402)
1992 Q3 1,950,100 62.54% $55.09 7,367 3,125,908 (579)
1992 Q4 1,942,500 62.13% $54.56 6,994 3,132,930 (28)
1993 Q1 1,965,000 62.50% $56.62 8,432 3,138,935 2,427
1993 Q2 1,974,500 62.76% $55.82 8,520 3,149,138 (1,683)
1993 Q3 1,996,300 63.41% $55.01 7,950 3,155,917 1,172
1993 Q4 2,014,200 63.67% $54.92 12,707 3,172,341 (3,718)
1994 Q1 2,055,600 64.54% $56.74 8,397 3,179,774 964
1994 Q2 2,061,500 64.63% $56.54 7,112 3,193,147 (6,261)
1994 Q3 2,076,800 64.99% $55.61 8,181 3,202,912 (1,584)
1994 Q4 2,122,000 66.17% $55.86 10,235 3,211,938 1,208
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